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Abstract
This paper attempts to identify present-biased procrastination in tax filing behavior. Our
exercise uses dynamic discrete choice techniques to develop a counterfactual benchmark for
filing behavior under the assumption of exponential discounting. Deviations between this coun-
terfactual benchmark and actual behavior provide potential ‘missing-mass’ evidence of present
bias. In a sample of around 22,000 low-income tax filers we demonstrate substantial devia-
tions between exponentially-predicted and realized behavior, particularly as the tax deadline
approaches. Present-biased preferences not only provide qualitatively better in-sample fit than
exponential discounting, but also have improved out-of-sample predictive power for respon-
siveness of filing times to the 2008 Economic Stimulus Act recovery payments. Additional
experimental data from around 1100 individuals demonstrates a link between experimentally
measured present bias and deviations from exponential discounting in tax filing behavior.
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1 Introduction
Present-biased preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001) are critical for un-
derstanding deviations from the neo-classical benchmark of exponentially discounted utility (Samuel-
son, 1937; Koopmans, 1960). Prominent anomalies such as self-control problems, the demand for
commitment devices, and procrastination in task performance revolve around the tension between
long-term plans and short-term temptations inherent to these models.
Identifying present-biased preferences from field data faces a natural challenge. Though the forces
of short-term temptations may be observed in behavior, researchers will rarely have access to data on
long-term plans.1 This paper presents a potential way to identify present-biased preferences from field
data. Our environment is the often-discussed problem of procrastination in tax-filing (Slemrod et
al., 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).2 Linking techniques from structural estimation of dynamic
discrete choice (Hotz and Miller, 1993; Arcidiciano and Ellickson, 2011) to empirical strategies from
public finance (Chetty et al., 2011), we propose a ‘missing mass’ method for identifying deviations
from exponential discounting in tax filing behavior. Present-biased procrastination is potentially
identified if true filing close to the tax deadline substantially exceeds counterfactual exponential
filing.
Differentiating procrastination from optimal delay in the context of tax-filing is notoriously dif-
ficult. First, Internal Revenue Service data generally only provides the date which the tax return is
processed and not the date of filing (Slemrod et al., 1997; Benzarti, 2015).3 Second, if costs of filing
1It is potentially for this reason that the body of evidence in support of present-biased preferences comes largely from
laboratory study. See Frederick et al. (2002) for a review of the literature and Sprenger (2015) for recent discussion.
When field data are used, the arguments in support of present-biased preferences are often calibrational, suggesting
that implausibly high levels of discounting would be required to rationalize an observed data set (see, e.g., Fang and
Silverman, 2009; Shapiro, 2005); that exponential discounting provides substantially worse fit than a present-biased
alternative (see, e.g., Laibson et al., 2005); or sidestep the necessity of having both plan and behavior by providing
smoking-gun evidence of sophisticated present bias in the form of commitment demand (see, e.g., Ashraf et al., 2006;
Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002; Bisin and Hyndman, 2014; Kaur et al., 2010; Gine et al., 2010; Mahajan and Tarozzi,
2011). Laibson (2015) provides a recent discussion on the calibrational plausibility of commitment demand in the
presence of uncertainty and commitment costs, indicating that commitment may be the exception rather than the rule
in many settings.
2Slemrod et al. (1997) coined the phrase ‘April 15th Syndrome’. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) use tax filing as
their leading example of procrastination predicted by dynamic inconsistency.
3Slemrod et al. (1997) use the 1998 Internal Revenue Service Individual Model File of 95,000 tax returns for the
1988 tax year appended with the date assigned by the IRS Service Center upon receipt. Reference is subsequently
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are stochastic, one should expect to see heterogeneous filing times as well as increased filing close to
the deadline as the option value of future filing diminishes (Slemrod et al., 1997).4 Hence, increased
filing close to the deadline is not sufficient to identify procrastination. This project overcomes these
issues by using precise data on tax return initiation and filing dates at community tax centers, and
by explicitly recognizing stochastic costs in the construction of our exponential benchmark. Further,
we link our estimates with both responses to changing filing incentives and experimental measures
of time preferences to provide external validation for our interpretation of present-biased procrasti-
nation.
In a sample of 22,526 low-income tax filers in the City of Boston from 2005 to 2008, we identify
a substantial missing mass in filing behavior relative to an exponential benchmark. Despite a high
degree of estimated impatience under exponential discounting, we document a wide deviation between
actual and predicted filing probabilities as the end of the tax season approaches. These deviations
deliver a missing mass of around 80% additional tax filers relative to the exponential benchmark in
the last seven days prior to the deadline.
We interpret our missing mass as evidence of present-biased procrastination in filing and bolster
this interpretation with three pieces of evidence. First, alternative rationalizations for the missing
mass such as unaccounted-for costs or shocks yield implausible, extreme parameters. Conversely,
the data can be rationalized with a relatively small degree of present bias. This gives calibrational
support to our interpretation. Second, within our sample period lies the 2008 Economic Stimulus
Act, which generated plausibly exogenous variation in filing benefits for 2008 Stimulus Payment
made to the date of processing throughout the text and more than than 25% of returns occur in the second half of
April (April 17th was the deadline in 1989). Note is made of the potential for IRS delays in assigning dates for returns
received during ‘the last-minute surge of filings in April’ (p.698). Slemrod et al. (1997) make use of the 1979-1988
Statistics of Income Panel to conduct longitudinal analysis. The process date is not available in this panel so they
use the week at which the return was posted to the IRS Individual Master File and note that the median posting
is beyond the tax filing deadline, but that substantial correlation exists between the posting weeks and the process
dates. Benzarti (2015) also makes use of the Statistics of Income Panel posting dates and relates them to itemized
deductions. As alluded to by Slemrod et al. (1997), a non-standard measurement error problem may be generated if
one wishes to use IRS process or posting dates as a proxy for filing times. The correlation between filing dates and
process dates is likely influenced by the number of filers. Hence, the concordance between the true measure and the
proxy changes through time and is likely worst close to the deadline.
4Slemrod et al. (1997) explicitly notes the potential importance of stochastic costs in rationalizing the observed
distribution of filing behavior including both heterogeneity and late filing. Though the authors term late filing behavior
‘procrastination’ they note explicitly that their rationalization is dynamically consistent.
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recipients.5 If individuals were as impatient as our exponential estimates imply, they should exhibit
no response to these additional filing benefits. In contrast, difference-in-difference estimates suggest
stimulus recipients file around 2 days earlier under the stimulus, a sensitivity that is well predicted
out-of-sample by our estimated degree of present bias. Third, we have access to a sub-sample of 1114
individuals who completed incentivized time preference experiments in 2007 and 2008. This sample
allows us to link experimental measures of present bias to deviations from exponential discounting
in tax filing behavior. The gap between predicted and actual filing behavior correlates strongly with
our experimental measures. Present-biased subjects file disproportionately later than exponential
prediction relative to other experimental subjects, and this difference is most pronounced towards
the end of the tax filing season.
We believe the methods implemented and the results obtained in this paper contribute to several
strands of literature in behavioral economics and the broader field.
First, our methods show a path forward for identifying behavioral anomalies in field behavior by
implementing structural estimation of a specific, neoclassical model to construct the counterfactual
benchmark. A growing body of empirical projects identify behavioral forces using measures of missing
mass relative to a traditional atheoretic benchmark such as a smooth or unchanging distribution of
behavior (see, e.g., Rees-Jones, 2013; Benzarti, 2015; Allen et al., Forthcoming). In many cases, such
as ours, researchers may be interested in rejecting a specific model of behavior rather than a class
thereof. Using theory and structural techniques to guide counterfactual construction expands the
scope of such missing mass techniques.6
Second, and related to the point above, once a single counterfactual model of behavior is rejected,
many candidate theories may arise to ‘rationalize’ the missing mass. As carefully demonstrated by
Einav et al. (2016) for the case of bunching estimators, different candidate theories could make
dramatically different predictions for responsiveness to key policy variables. Assessing the predictive
validity of our favored candidate theory by examining responsiveness to the exogenous changes in
5It should be noted that the timing of the 2008 Stimulus Payments did not depend on the timing of tax-filing.
However, in the advertisement of the program, the IRS clearly conveyed linkages between tax filing timing and Stimulus
Payment receipt. See section 2.2 for discussion and details.
6Section 3.3 provides additional discussion of these points
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filing incentives induced by the 2008 Stimulus Payments is a key contribution of this paper. Such
out-of-sample steps are particularly important to take if candidate theories are behavioral, as appeal
to additional free parameters in behavioral models will necessarily deliver greater in-sample fit.
DellaVigna et al. (Forthcoming) provides one recent demonstration of the value of such out-of-sample
tests for behavioral models of reference dependence in the context of job search.7
Third, we use experimental measures of time preferences to validate our interpretation of present
bias in tax filing. Importantly, our experimental measures come from choices over time-dated mon-
etary payments. A growing discussion in the behavioral literature has questioned the use of such
measures given the fungibility of money (Cubitt and Read, 2007; Chabris et al., 2008; Andreoni and
Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 20016; Dean and Sautmann, 2016). Our
findings illustrate that such measures may indeed be informative of true preferences given that they
relate to apparent procrastination in filing behavior. This also complements the recent contributions
of Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011), who show that experimentally elicited preference measures can be
productively incorporated into structural approaches in this domain.8
Fourth, our paper delivers potentially policy relevant measures of procrastination for the low-
income population in question. As noted above, distinguishing procrastination from optimal delay
can be extremely difficult. With our credible estimates of present bias we can identify those indi-
viduals that are more likely to have procrastinated than not prior to the day they file. Given the
aggregate preference estimates, we calculate that on the day of filing, twenty-one percent of filers
planned to have filed previously with higher probability than their present-biased behavior delivered.
Such potential procrastination is exacerbated at the end of the tax season with roughly seventy-one
7DellaVigna et al. (Forthcoming) examine exit from unemployment under reference-dependent preferences and show
their preferred model not only rationalizes job finding hazard rates better than a standard model but also provides
improved prediction for responsiveness to changes in the structure of unemployment insurance benefits. DellaVigna
et al. (Forthcoming) also include a second behavioral parameter beyond reference dependence in the form of present
bias. Their estimation strategy of assuming full naivete for this exercise inspired our own. See section 4.2 for detail.
8Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) incorporate experimental measures for time inconsistency, beliefs about disease
infection, and purchase and treatment decisions for insecticide treated bednets to estimate the extent of present bias
and ‘sophistication’ thereof. In their setting the experimental measures are used directly in estimation, while in
ours they are used for validation ex-post. One point noted by Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) is that in their case the
experimental measures themselves wind up having limited predictive power for estimates of present bias that result
from their structural exercise.
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percent of filers in the final week of the tax season being potential procrastinators. If such widespread
procrastination is indicative of behavior when accessing other government services relevant for many
low-income individuals, there may be valuable policy dollars spent in altering the timing of costs and
benefits of government assistance.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the data and the experimental procedures.
Section 3 then presents our empirical design and the construction of our missing mass measures.
Section 4 presents results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Our exercise makes use of three key data sources: 1) tax filing data from the City of Boston, Mas-
sachusetts; 2) variation in tax refunds due to the 2008 Stimulus Act; and 3) experimental measures
of time preferences from tax filers in 2007 and 2008.
2.1 Tax Filing Data
The data in this paper comes from 22 Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) sites in Boston,
Massachusetts from the years 2005 to 2008. VITA sites are organized by the City of Boston and the
Boston Tax Help Coalition. VITA sites provide free tax preparation assistance to low-to-moderate
income households in specific neighborhoods in order to help them claim valuable tax credits such as
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Boston’s VITA sites began in 2001 and continue to present.
As of the 2015 tax filing season there were 27 VITA sites in operation around the city, processing a
total of 12,940 returns and securing around $22.8 million in refunds of which $8.6 million were EITC
payments (see bostontaxhelp.org for current information and details).
VITA sites generally open in mid-January and close at the tax filing deadline around April 15.
Most sites have specific days and hours of operation, though some are open by appointment only.
Potential filers are encouraged to bring all required documentation (photo ID, W2 forms, 1099 forms,
etc.) to the VITA site. Sites have an in-take coordinator who provides filers with a check-list of
5
required documents. Filers are usually processed on a first-come, first-served basis and waiting times
at popular sites can be substantial during busy periods. Upon reaching the front of the queue,
the tax-filer meets with a volunteer preparer, the return is entered, and subsequently filed with the
Internal Revenue Service electronically.
In 2005 and 2006 we have access to the date the return was electronically filed, while in 2007
and 2008 we have both the date the return was initiated and the date the return was filed. Around
80% of returns in our final sample are filed within two days of initiation in 2007 and 2008, delivering
a close correspondence between when returns are initiated and when they are electronically sent to
the IRS. As the deadline approaches, the correspondence grows, with around 90% of returns filed
within two days of initiation during the last week of the tax season.9 Critical for the present study,
we are able to observe the full return information including the date each return was initiated and/or
electronically filed, whether any refund would be received via direct deposit or paper check, and the
size of federal refunds.
From 2005 to 2008 a total of 32,641 tax returns were initiated at VITA sites. Of these, 26,040
(87.6%) were filed electronically with documented acceptance by the IRS in our data.10 To have the
most precise measure possible for when individuals decide to file, we use the electronic filing date
from 2005-2006 and the initiation date from 2007-2008 as our measured filing date. We recognize
that the 2005-2006 filing times may slightly overstate the timing of tax filing relative to 2007-2008,
and so also provide all estimates using only the latter years for which precisely measured initiation
data are available11.
We restrict the sample along several other dimensions for our study of procrastination. First,
we remove 212 (0.8%) individuals who have filing dates after the filing deadline. Second, we focus
on only the 11 weeks prior to the deadline such that the majority of subjects can be expected to
9The mean (median) filing lag for 2007 and 2008 is 2.3 (0) days, and in the last week of the tax season the mean
(median) filing lag is 0.8 (0) days.
1028,606 returns were ever sent to the IRS. Of these 2215 (7.7%) returns have a documented rejection. Though
many of these returns were subsequently filed and accepted, our data have the initial electronic filing date overwritten
by the subsequent filing. For a further 352 (1.2%) returns, we have no documented acceptance. We are hesitant to
use these data as we are unsure either of the first filing date or of when, if ever, a refund was received.
11To to this end, we reproduce our primary estimation results, shown in table 2, with only 2007 data. The results
can be found in appendix table A2
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have received their primary tax documents such as W2’s.12 This eliminates 621 (2.4%) observations.
Third, we focus only on subjects with weakly positive refunds, eliminating a further 1457 (5.6%)
filers.13 Fourth, we eliminate 1174 (4.5%) individuals with zero dollars of taxable income and zero
dollars of refund. Such individuals would not generally need to file taxes, but do so likely because of
the 2008 Stimulus Payments which provided rebates to such filers.14 Fifth, a small number of subjects,
65 in total, appear to file on Sundays when VITA sites are generally closed and no electronic filing
should be possible. We believe these special cases correspond to appointments or VITA site workers
filing on their own behalf and, hence, drop these observations as well. In total, these restrictions
eliminate 13.5% of observations leaving a usable sample of 22,526 individual tax filings.
Table 1, Panel A presents summary statistics for our sample across the four years of our study.
Tax filers are around 38 years old, earn around $17,000 in adjusted gross income, and receive sizable
federal refunds of around $1,400. Tax filers have slightly more than half a dependent, and around
10% of subjects receive unemployment benefits in any given year. In addition to the above measured
socio-demographics which are captured directly from tax returns, VITA sites also ask tax-filers to
complete a socio-demographic survey to identify gender, race, and education levels. Response rates
for these questions vary from 77% to 78%. Panel B demonstrates that conditional on responding,
the majority of tax filers report they are female, African-American, and without college experience.
Table 1, Panel C presents two important time related variables: the number of days until the
filing deadline and whether or not a tax-filer opts to receive their refund by direct deposit. In order to
identify the number of days until the tax filing deadline we subtract the deadline date from the filing
date. On average filing occurs 44 days before the tax filing deadline with substantial heterogeneity.
Individuals who receive their refund by direct deposit can expect to receive their refund substantially
12Our empirical exercise will require individuals to project whether individuals with similar characteristics will file
in the next period. Including the relatively sparse data outside of 11 weeks, generates some missing or extreme
projections.
13Because or tax filers have relatively low incomes, they generally receive substantial proportional refunds associated
with the EITC and other tax credits. Our empirical exercise estimates an optimal stopping problem with costs of filing
and refund benefits. We do not explicitly model the kink in incentives associated with filing beyond the deadline and
incurring a tax penalty if one has a negative refunds. With negative refunds, individuals will have incentives primarily
to file close to the deadline.
14Indeed, 906 of 1174 (77.2%) individuals who fall into this category are observed in 2008.
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earlier than those who do not. Given that only 40% of our sample opts for direct deposit, this presents
potentially important cross-sectional variation in the timing of refund receipts.15
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
Tax Return Information Demographics: Filing and Direct Deposit
Variable Obs Mean Variable Obs Mean Variable Obs Mean
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
Age 22524 37.87 Female (=1) 17541 0.648 Days until Deadline 22526 44.06
(15.54) (0.48) (21.68)
Adjusted Gross Income 22526 16924.8 Black (=1) 17268 0.560 Direct Deposit (=1) 22526 0.397
(13367.2) (0.50) (0.49)
Federal Refund 22526 1419.82 College Experience (=1) 16757 0.155
(1618.2) (0.36)
# Dependents 22526 0.535
(0.87)
Unemployed (=1) 22526 0.095
(0.29)
Notes: Summary statistics for refund recipients with electronic filing at Boston VITA tax centers between 2005
and 2008. Panel A and Panel C data collected from individual tax returns. Panel B data collected from voluntary
demographic survey.
2.2 Economic Stimulus Act 2008
A key component of our exercise attempts to predict sensitivity of filing behavior to the exogenous
change in filing incentives provided by the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. Under the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008 (H.R. 5140) passed on February 7, 2008, tax filers earning less that $75,000
($150,000 for joint filers) received ‘Recovery Rebates’ between $300 and $1200, depending on filing
status and income levels. The Stimulus Payments were announced in February 2008. In practice,
these payments were generally disbursed between late April and July of 2008 depending on the
social security number of the tax filer. In 2008, 90% of the filers we observe qualified to receive
Stimulus Payments. Appendix Figure A1 presents the histogram of Stimulus Payments calculated
15Each year (through 2012) the IRS provided tax-filers with a refund cycle linking electronic filing and acceptance
dates to dates when direct deposits would be sent and paper checks would be mailed. In general, accepted returns
are batched by week and paper checks are mailed one week after direct deposits are sent. For our baseline estimate
we ignore the discontinuities in refund receipt induced by this batching protocol as it is unlikely that tax-filers in our
sample would have access to such information. Additionally, the data do not appear to reflect the batch discontinuities
with individuals bunching close to batch endpoints.
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from individual tax return data.16
Prima-facie, the 2008 Stimulus Payments, whose values were based on predetermined income and
demographics, could provide for exogenous variation in refund sizes and give potential for difference-
in-difference investigation across recipients and non-recipients. However, the timing of tax-filing
had no true impact on the receipt of the Stimulus Payments and hence did not truly influence the
intertemporal tradeoffs. Nonetheless, it is not clear that tax filers at VITA sites, or anyone else
for that matter, were aware of this point. The initial February 2008 announcement did not clarify
that the timing of Stimulus Payments was decoupled from dates of tax-filing, but noted only that
the payments would begin being made in May of 2008.17 Furthermore, the IRS’ documentation of
the Stimulus Payments may have created the impression that Stimulus Payment timing was linked
to filing dates. Filers examining the Frequently Asked Questions website related to the Stimulus
Payment asking ‘When will I receive my Stimulus Payment?’ were told18:
Processing times for tax returns and Stimulus Payments vary. If you are getting a regular
tax refund, the IRS will send you that refund first. Normally, your Stimulus Payment
will follow one to two weeks later.
Such information likely gave filers the impression of a tight link between filing times and Stimulus
Payment receipt. The 2008 Stimulus Payments generate plausibly exogenous variation in the benefits
of filing. In Section 4.3 we use the 2008 Stimulus Payment data and attempt to predict responsiveness
to these changing filing incentives under our estimated preferences out-of-sample.
16The 2008 stimulus rebate took two forms. The first was allocated according to filing status, tax liability, adjusted
gross income, and number of dependents. The second was allocated according to filing status, number of dependents,
adjusted gross income, social security, and other qualifying income. The first type was phased in and out according
to AGI. Each individual received the larger of the two rebates. The exact formula is detailed in the “Technical
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of H.R. 5140.” Using each individual’s 1040A data we calculated their rebates
with python script.
17Appendix B reproduces the IRS announcement. Additionally, the actual process of payment was not described
in the technical description of the Stimulus Payments. Appendix C reproduces the relevant portions of the technical
explanation of the revenue provisions of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.
18See https://www.irs.gov/uac/Economic-Stimulus-Payment-Q&As:-When-Will-I-Get-the-Payment%3F for details.
This website was updated in July 2008 likely to reflect the volume of payment to date.
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2.3 Experimentally Elicited Time Preferences
For a subsample of tax filers, we have independent measures of time preferences elicited using ex-
perimental methods. In 2007 and 2008 at one VITA site, in Roxbury, MA, we conducted incentivized
intertemporal choice experiments throughout the tax filing season. These data are discussed in detail
in Meier and Sprenger (2015), which analyzes stability of elicited preferences at the aggregate and
individual level.19 A total of 1906 individuals in our sample received tax-filing assistance in 2007 and
2008 at the Roxbury VITA site. Of these 1,794 filed their taxes on one of the days the experiment
was conducted and were eligible to participate. In both years VITA site intake material included
identical, incentive-compatible choice experiments to elicit time preferences. The choice experiments
were presented on a single colored sheet of paper and were turned in at the end of tax-filing for
potential payments (see below). The experimental paradigm is presented as Appendix D. 1300
individuals, (72.5%) elected to participate. Appendix Table A1 presents observable characteristics
of our experimental subjects and compares them to the observables of non-participating subjects at
the Roxbury VITA site. Experimental subjects appear similar on observables to non-participating
subjects.
Individual time preferences are elicited using identical incentivized multiple price lists in both 2007
and 2008 (for similar approaches to elicit time preferences, see Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et
al., 2002; McClure et al., 2004; Dohmen et al., 2006; Tanaka et al., 2010; Burks et al., 2009; Benjamin
et al., 2010; Ifcher and Zarghamee, Forthcoming). Individuals were given three multiple price lists
and asked to make a total of 22 choices between a smaller reward, X, in period t and a larger reward,
Y > X, in period t + τ > t. We keep Y constant at $50 and vary X from $49 to $14 in three time
frames. In Time Frame 1, t is the present, t = 0, and τ is one month. In Time Frame 2, t is the
present, and τ is six months. In Time Frame 3, t is six months from the study date, and τ is again
one month. The order of the three time frames was randomized. Appendix D provides the full set
of choices.
19Meier and Sprenger (2015) demonstrate stable choice profiles and corresponding parameter estimates at both
levels and a one-year correlation in behavior of around 0.5. Instability in experimental choice is largely orthogonal
from demographics or changes in financial situation.
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In order to provide an incentive for truthful choice, 10 percent of individuals were randomly
paid one of their 22 choices (for comparable methodologies and discussions, see, e.g., Harrison et al.,
2002). This was done with a raffle ticket, which subjects took at the end of their tax filing and which
indicated which choice, if any, would result in payment. To ensure credibility of the payments, we
filled out money orders for the winning amounts on the spot in the presence of the participants, put
them in labeled, pre-stamped envelopes and sealed the envelopes. The payment was guaranteed by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and individuals were informed that they could always return to
the head of the VITA site (the community center director) where the experiment was run to report
any problems receiving the payments. Money orders were sent by mail to the winner’s home address
on the same day as the experiment if t = 0, or in one, six, or seven months, depending on the winner’s
choice. All payments were sent by mail to equate the transaction costs of sooner and later payments.
The details of the payment procedure of the choice experiments were kept the same in the two years
and participants were fully informed about the method of payment.
The multiple price list design yields 22 individual-level decisions between smaller, sooner payments
X and larger, later payments Y . We term the series of decisions between X and Y a choice profile.
We make one restriction on admissible choice profiles: that the choices satisfy monotonicity within
a price list.20 Roughly 86% of our sample, or 1114 individuals satisfy this restriction
In order to identify present bias from the observed choice profiles, we examine choices made
in Time Frame 1 (t = 0, τ = 1), and Time Frame 3 (t = 6, τ = 1). Let X∗1 be the smallest
value of X for which an individual chooses X over Y in Time Frame 1, and let X∗3 be the smallest
value of X for which an individual chooses X over Y in Time Frame 3. An individual is coded as
Present-Biased if X∗1 < X
∗
3 , having expressed more patience over six vs. seven months than over
today vs. one month. Similar measures for identifying time preferences from experimental data
20That is, individuals do not choose X over Y and Y over X ′ if X ′ < X. This restriction is equivalent to focusing
on individuals with unique monotonic switch points and individuals without any switch points in each price list. The
level of non-monotonicity obtained in our data compares favorably to the level obtained in other multiple price list
experiments with college students, where around 10% of individuals have non-unique switch points (Holt and Laury,
2002) and is substantially below some field observations where as many as 50% of individuals exhibit non-unique
switch points (Jacobson and Petrie, 2009). For non-monotonic subjects we are unable to have a complete record of
their choices as we measure only their first switch point and whether they switched more than once. Price list analysis
often either enforces a single switch point (Harrison et al., 2005) or eliminates such observations.
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have been employed by Coller and Williams (1999); Harrison et al. (2005); McClure et al. (2004);
Dohmen et al. (2006); Tanaka et al. (2010); Burks et al. (2009); Benjamin et al. (2010); Ifcher and
Zarghamee (Forthcoming); Meier and Sprenger (2010). Of our 1114 subjects, 360 (32%) are classified
as Present-Biased.21
In Section 4.4, we link this experimental measure of present bias to deviations from exponential
discounting in tax filing behavior.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy for identifying deviations from exponential discounting in tax filing has
three primary components. First, we construct and estimate a dynamic discrete choice, optimal
stopping model for the timing of tax filing. Importantly, this model is estimated under the assumption
of exponential discounting. Second, we construct a counterfactual distribution of filing behavior based
on the estimated exponential parameters. And third, we identify deviations from the exponential
benchmark by statistically comparing realized and counterfactual behavior.
3.1 Tax Filing as Dynamic Discrete Choice
An individual’s decision to file taxes can be viewed as an optimal stopping problem. In each
period before the filing deadline, the individual decides whether to incur a realized cost and receive
the benefit of sooner receipt of their refund, or to wait to file on a future date. Though all individuals
in our sample receive positive refunds, and hence face no penalty for late filing, we assume the costs
of filing become sufficiently high once the VITA sites close such that no individual ever desires or
forecasts filing after the deadline.22 The methodology we implement and the following notation
borrows heavily from Hotz and Miller (1993); Arcidiciano and Ellickson (2011).
There are N individual tax filers, indexed by i. Time is discrete, indexed by t, with T denoting
21111 (10%) of subjects are classified as Future-Biased with X∗1 > X
∗
3 . The remaining 643 subjects (58%) exhibit
X∗1 = X
∗
3 consistent with exponential discounting.
22In principle, individuals with positive refunds have three years to file and claim their refunds from the IRS. After
three years, the funds become the property of the United States Treasury.
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the period of the tax deadline. In each period, tax filers take actions ait. They either decide to
postpone filing (ait = 0) or to file (ait = 1). Let fit denote the individual’s filing status in period
t such that fit = 1 if the individual has not yet filed by period t − 1 and fit = 0 if the individual
has filed by period t− 1. We assume that each individual will receive a positive refund, bi, constant
through time and known to the researcher and the filer. This refund is to be received in a fixed
number of periods, k, after filing. The state variables known to the researcher are xit = (fit, bi),
which is is Markov.
We assume that costs of filing have both a fixed and an idiosyncratic component. The fixed
costs of filing are denoted by c and the time-varying idiosyncratic shocks are denoted by it. These
shocks are contemporaneously observed by the filer but unobserved to the researcher. These shocks
may depend on the choice of filing and hence we write (ait). We assume (ait) is independent and
identically distributed over time with pdf g((ait)). This is an unknown state variable.
Filer utility is additively separable. The utility of filing in period t is
δkbit − c+ (1)
when ait = 1 and fit = 1. The variable δ
k is a k period exponential discount factor homogeneous in
the population of filers. Utility is (0) if ait = 0 and fit = 1. As such, the flow utility can be written
u(xit, ait) + it(ait) = aitfit(δ
kbi − c) + it(ait).
With these flow utilities, the filer maximizes the present discounted value of filing-related utilities
by choosing α∗i , a set of decision rules for all possible realizations of observed and unobserved state
variables in each time period. That is,
α∗i = arg maxαiEαi
T∑
t=1
δt−1[u(xit, ait) + it(ait)].
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The corresponding value function at time t can be defined recursively as
Vit(xit, it) = maxait [u(xit, ait) + it(ait) + δE [Vi,t+1(xi,t+1, i,t+1)|xit, ait]]
We define the ex-ante value function, V it(xit), obtained by integrating over the possible realizations
of shocks as
V it(xit) ≡
∫
Vit(xit, it)g(it)dit.
We additionally define the conditional value function vit(xit, ait) as the present discounted value (net
of the shocks it) of choosing ait and behaving optimally from period t+ 1 on as
vit(xit, ait) ≡ u(xit, ait) + δ
∫
V i,t+1(xi,t+1)f(xi,t+1|xit, ait)dxi,t+1.
The optimal decision rule at time t solves
αit(xit, it) = arg maxaitvit(xit, ait) + it(ait).
3.1.1 Type-1 Extreme Value Errors
Following the logic of static discrete choice problems, the probability of observing an action ait
conditional on xit is found by integrating out it from the optimal decision rule.
p(ait|xit) =
∫
1[αit(xit, it) = ait]g(it)dit
=
∫
1[arg maxaitvit(xit, ait) + it(ait) = ait]g(it)dit
Hence, if we are able to form the conditional value function vit(xit, ait), standard methods can be
applied.
In order to obtain choice probabilities and other constructs in closed form, we assume a type-1
extreme value distribution, fixing the location parameter equal to minus Euler’s constant, −γ =
14
−0.5772, and the scale parameter to 1.23 This leads to a dynamic logit model where the probability
of an arbitrary choice ait is given by
p(ait|xit) = exp(vit(xit, ait))∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit, a′it))
.
Or,
p(ait|xit) = 1∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit, a′it)− vit(xit, ait))
.
As in the standard logit, the probability of any action being taken is expressed in terms of relative
utility values or utility differences. Here, however, the relevant utility values are the conditional
value functions. The conditional value functions carry with them both the current flow payoffs and
discounted considerations of taking the prescribed action and then acting optimally from then on.
Importantly, under the above distributional assumption we also have the ex-ante value function
in closed form.
V it(xit) = ln
∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit, a
′
it))
 .
A powerful observation by Hotz and Miller (1993) recognizes that
V it(xit) = −ln[p(a∗it|xit)] + vit(xit, a∗it)
23The cumulative distribution function of a type-1 extreme value random variable, X, Prob(X ≤ x) = F (x;µ, λ) =
e−e
−(x−µ)/λ
, is summarized by location parameter, µ, and scale parameter, λ. The expectation is
E[X] = µ+ γλ,
such that fixing location µ = −γ and λ = 1 ensures the shocks are mean zero. In most situations, imposing mean
zero shocks is inconsequential as choices are driven by the difference between action-specific shocks. In period T ,
however, the individual must file if she has not yet, and so in period T − 1 the individual forecasts only one relevant
shock in the subsequent period. Additionally, in all prior periods, choosing to file in the period stops the problem and
sets all future flow utilities to zero, while choosing not to file exposes the decisionmaker to future shocks. Under the
traditional assumption that µ = 0, such future shocks would yield additional option value to not filing in any period.
In Appendix Table A3 we re-estimate the specifications of Table 2 with the traditional assumption of µ = 0 and show
that estimated discount factors and costs are both slightly reduced under this assumption. Note as well, that the
variance of a type-1 extreme value random variable is λpi
2
6 , such that restricting λ = 1 also restricts the variance of
the shocks to be pi
2
6 . In section 4.1.1 we analyze behavior with alternate assumptions for λ, and ensure that both our
estimated model and simulations with µ = −γ and λ = 1 predict identical behavior.
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for some arbitrary action taken at time t, a∗it. This expresses the ex-ante value of being at a given
state as the conditional value of taking an arbitrary action adjusted for a penalty that the arbitrary
action might not be optimal. We can substitute this in to our equation for the conditional value
function to obtain
vit(xit, ait) = u(xit, ait) + δ
∫
(vi,t+1(xi,t+1, a
∗
i,t+1)− ln[p(a∗i,t+1|xi,t+1)])f(xi,t+1|xit, ait)dxi,t+1
The components of the conditional value function are contemporaneous flow payoffs, u(xit, ait),
the one period ahead conditional value function for the arbitrary action, vi,t+1(xi,t+1, a
∗
i,t+1), condi-
tional choice probabilities for the arbitrary action p(a∗i,t+1|xi,t+1), and state transition probabilities,
f(xi,t+1|xit, ait). These constructs are obtainable in the following ways:
Formulating Contemporaneous Flow Payoffs: The flow payoffs are established as δkbit− c if a person
enters period t without having filed and files in that period. The flow payoffs are 0 otherwise. The
refund value noted in Table 1, provides the value bit. This refund will be received in k periods with
the assumptions that for direct deposit filers, k = 14 while for paper check filers k = 21.24 The
parameters to estimate are the discount factor, δ, and filing costs, c.
Obtaining Conditional Choice Probabilities: We wish to have an estimated probability for ait given
the state vector xit. Our states are the benefit amount, bi, and whether someone has not already
filed, fit. These can be calculated with simple bin estimators.
p˜(ait|xit) =
∑N
i=1 1(ait = at, xit = xt)∑N
i=1 1(xit = xt)
Obtaining State Transition Probabilities: Our only states are the benefit amounts bi and the filing
24We follow the IRS refund cycle charts for 2005-2008 to arrive at these values of k.
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status fit. The benefit amount is unchanging through time, and conditional upon fit and the the
choice ait, fi,t+1 can be known with certainty. Hence, all the state transition probabilities are 1.
Obtaining Arbitrary Action Payoff from Terminating Actions: Our setup is such that there exist
terminating actions. Once a filer files, no further choice can be made. The decision problem is
no longer dynamic. This is important because if we think of this terminating action of filing as
the arbitrary action, a∗i,t+1, then the remaining analysis is dramatically simplified. The terminating
action makes all future payoffs zero and makes future shocks irrelevant. Filling in a∗i,t+1 = 1 as the
arbitrary action, we know that the t+ 1 conditional value function will be
vi,t+1(1, bi, 1) = δ
k
i bi − c
if fi,t+1 = 1. Otherwise, the individual has already filed, fi,t+1 = 0, and this along with all future
values are deterministically zero.
3.1.2 Likelihood Formulation
Our primary equation for the value of a given action given a particular state is
vit(xit, ait) = u(xit, ait) + δ
∫
(vi,t+1(xi,t+1, a
∗
i,t+1)− ln[p(a∗i,t+1|xi,t+1)])f(xi,t+1|xit, ait)dxi,t+1
The critical case for our estimator is xit = (fit, bi) = (1, bi). The individual has not yet filed their
taxes and decides between filing today and not filing today. Filing today yields immediate costs and
discounted benefits. It also transitions the future filing state to fi,t+1 = 0, such that all future flow
payoffs and the future ex-ante value function is zero. Together these yield
vit(1, bi, 1) = δ
kbi − c+ δ
∫
0
vit(1, bi, 1) = δ
kbi − c
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Now, consider the individual who chooses to not file. Filing today yields zero costs and zero benefits.
It advances time, but the state in the future will be xi,t+1 = (1, bi,t+1) with probability 1. Given this
state and the arbitrary action that the individual files, the value of this option is simply calculated
as well.
vit(xit, ait) = u(xit, ait) + δ
∫
(vi,t+1(xi,t+1, 1)− ln[p(1|xi,t+1)])f(xi,t+1|xit, ait)dxi,t+1
vit(1, bi, 0) = 0 + δ[δ
kbi − c]− δln[p(1|xi,t+1)])
vit(1, bi, 0) = δ
k+1bi − δc− δln[p(1|xi,t+1)])
We can evaluate the difference between these two conditional value functions as:
vit(1, bi, 0)− vit(1, bi, 1) =[
δk+1bi − δc− δln[p(1|xi,t+1)])
]− [δkbi − c] =
(δk+1 − δk)bi − (δ − 1)c− δln(p(1|1, bi)).
Under the error distribution, we have:
p(ait|xit) = 1∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit, a′it)− vit(xit, ait))
.
Or,
p(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp [(δk+1 − δk)bi − (δ − 1)c− δln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))] .
This represents the likelihood contribution of observation t for individual i given the decisionmaker
has not filed yet. Note that we only need to consider those periods up until the time when the person
files. Once they file, the utility consequences of filing are eliminated and the likelihood contribution
is zero for such observations. Let Di be the filing date of a given individual. The grand log likelihood
is written as
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L =
N∑
i=1
[
Di∑
t=1
ln[p(1it|1it, bi)]
]
(1)
3.1.3 Identification
From the likelihood of (1), we wish to estimate the parameters δ and c. It is worth noting that
exercises of this form suffer generically from identification problems (Rust, 1994). The underlying
issue is that monotonic transformations of the instantaneous utility function will yield identical
choice rules and hence identical likelihoods. Normalizations and functional form assumptions are
often invoked to deliver credible estimates of remaining parameters. One frequent normalization
is to assume a specific one period discount factor (Bajari et al., 2007; Kennan and Walker, 2011;
Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007).25
Our environment differs in one compelling way from most exercises in that filing costs and benefits
are not experienced in the same period. The fact that k > 0 delivers some potential for estimating
both δ and c from the data. Naturally, this is in the presence of our additional functional form
assumptions and normalizing post-filing payoffs to zero, but without k > 0, the identification issues
would be severe. In Appendix A.2, we describe this point in detail. We show in (δ, c) space that level
sets of conditional filing probabilities for multiple periods tightly overlap when k = 0, indicating that
many parameter constellations lead to the same probabilistic choice behavior. When k > 0, these
level sets separate, implying differential intertemporal pattens of probabilistic behavior for different
parameter combinations. Of additional note is that for different values of k > 0, the same parameters
lead to (at times notably) different filing probabilities. Hence, differential direct deposit use, which
generates differences in k, delivers additional identifying variation.
25The identification of the discount factor in dynamic discrete choice settings has received substantial theoretical
attention. Several potential paths forward have been proposed that are not reliant of functional form for identification.
One is using variation that changes transition probabilities but do not change contemporaneous utilities (Magnac and
Thesmar, 2002). This technique has been usefully applied by Fang and Wang (2015) and Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011)
not just for identifying the discount factor, but also for present bias. We are not aware of a variable that can serve
such a purpose in our setting.
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3.2 Constructing Counterfactuals
Maximum likelihood estimation of the above dynamic discrete logit provides parameter estimates
for discounting and the costs of filing, δˆ and cˆ. With these parameters in hand one can construct the
counterfactual distribution of filing behavior through backwards induction at the estimated values
of δˆ and cˆ,
pˆ(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp
[
(δˆk+1 − δˆk)bi − (δˆ − 1)cˆ− δˆln(pˆ(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))
] ,
with pˆ(1iT |1iT , bi) = 1. A first natural counterfactual distribution for behavior is the average fitted
conditional filing probability,
pˆ(1t|1t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
pˆ(1it|1ti, bi).
This counterfactual distribution could be compared to its empirical analog p˜(1t|1t) to examine the
adherence of true and estimated conditional filing probabilities for all periods until period T − 1.26
Under the assumptions of the model, exponential discounting and rational expectations, pˆ(1t|1t) and
p˜(1t|1t) should coincide perfectly.27
From the conditional filing probability, pˆ(1it|1it, bi), one can construct additional counterfactuals
for other aspects of filing behavior. First, one can construct the probability of filing unconditional
on the contemporaneous filing status, fit, as
qˆ(1it|bi) = pˆ(1it|1it, bi) Πt−1s=0(1− pˆ(1is|1is, bi)),
26In period T , the filing probability is assumed to be 1 and all remaining individuals will file by construction.
27An alternative counterfactual that does not rely on backwards induction can also be generated. One simply
constructs the fitted probabilities using the bin estimates for future filing probabilities, p˜(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi), as the
future values,
ˆˆp(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp
[
(δˆk+1 − δˆk)bi − (δˆ − 1)cˆ− δˆln(p˜(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))
] .
The average fitted value is thus
ˆˆp(1t|1t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
ˆˆp(1it|1it, bi).
We examine such an alternative and find qualitatively very similar results (see section ?? for details).
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and the number and percentage of filers at t as
∑N
i=1 qˆ(1it|bi) and 100N
∑N
i=1 qˆ(1it|bi), respectively.
Additional useful constructs are the expected average refund value at t,
bˆt =
∑N
i=1 qˆ(1it|bi)× bi∑N
i=1 qˆ(1it|bi)
,
and the expected filing date for individual i,
tˆ∗i =
T∑
t=0
qˆ(1it|bi)× t.
Our estimator is disciplined by the data in that the probability of filing in a given period is
informed by the forecasted conditional filing probability which is correct in expectation. This reliance
on rational expectations in estimation allows the estimator to make use of the wealth of expectations
information in the data (Arcidiciano and Ellickson, 2011). However, it necessarily entails constructing
counterfactual distributions under the joint assumption of rational expectations and exponential
discounting.
3.3 Missing and Excess Mass
In order to identify deviations from exponential discounting, the true distributions of behav-
ior must deviate substantially from predicted distributions. That is, exponential discounting must
mischaracterize the intertemporal patterns of filing.
Our methodology is similar in spirit to previous research identifying the force of incentives using
estimates of missing or excess mass in a true distribution relative to a counterfactual distribution
(Chetty et al., 2011; Rees-Jones, 2013; Allen et al., Forthcoming). In prior exercises a smooth coun-
terfactual distribution of behavior is estimated with non-parametric measures such as a n-degree
polynomial. These estimates are constructed excluding a specific region of interest and then pro-
jected into the excluded region. Our counterfactual distribution is delivered by estimates from an
optimal stopping problem and not from an assumption of smooth behavior. As in prior exercises,
counterfactual and actual distributions are compared and a bootstrap procedure is implemented to
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provide standard errors and confidence intervals for our measures of missing mass.
Specifically, we use a standard stratified bootstrap (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). Our bootstrap
proceeds in three stages. First, stratifying by year, we independently resample the data set 500 times,
constructing each time the one period ahead conditional filing probability bin estimates for the given
sample. Second, we implement our maximum likelihood estimation on each sample. This yields 500
estimates of δˆ and cˆ. Third, using these estimates we generate 500 counterfactual distributions for
filing behavior. Fourth, we take the difference between the resampled observed filing behavior and
counterfactual filing behavior. This yields a distribution of 500 missing mass estimates upon which
statistical tests can be implemented.
Developing a counterfactual from a theoretical basis is an important extension relative to prior
efforts. First, given that the counterfactual distribution is grounded in theory, rejecting the counter-
factual rejects a specific model of behavior. Prior efforts using smoothed polynomial counterfactuals
allow one to reject any smooth model, but cannot arbitrate between candidate theories conditional
on being smooth. Second, the use of smoothed polynomial predictions requires both that a rele-
vant underlying theory predicts both smooth behavior and continuity through a point of potentially
changing incentives (Chetty et al., 2011). In our environment of tax filing, there is no guarantee
that behavior be smooth, as filing probabilities may well have a severe point of inflection shortly in
advance of the filing deadline. Furthermore, in our environment, the change in incentives is so sharp
(i.e., the tax filing centers close), that we observe virtually no data after a given point in time. Our
extension demonstrates that missing or excess mass estimators with theoretical foundations not only
sharpen the conclusions drawn from rejecting equality of counterfactual and realized distributions,
but also expand the scope of application for such methods.
4 Results
We present the results in four steps: First, we present baseline dynamic discrete choice estimates
of exponential discounting and missing mass deviations therefrom. We also discuss a number of
alternative specifications retaining exponential discounting that also fail to credibly account for
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the observed missing mass. Second, we present dynamic discrete choice estimates of present-biased
preferences, rationalizing the deviations from exponential discounting in filing behavior at reasonable
parameter values. Third, we use the 2008 Stimulus Act and examine the out-of-sample validity of
our estimated present-biased model for predicting sensitivities of filing times to changes in filing
incentives. Fourth, in a sub-sample of around 1100 subjects we link deviations from exponential
discounting in filing behavior to experimental measures of present bias to provide further validation
for our behavioral interpretation of the data.
4.1 Estimates of Exponential (δ) Discounting
Figure 1 presents histograms of filing behavior in each year from 2005 to 2008. The figure shows
that a large proportion of individuals file early in the tax filing season, with the numbers declining
until approximately day 50. From day 50 to the end of the season a pronounced increase in filing
is observed. Roughly 9% of filers arrive at VITA sites in the last seven days of operation each year.
Also presented in Figure 1 is the average refund value among filers each day. The average value of
refunds declines regularly from the beginning of the tax filing season to the end.
Our estimation technique links refund values, filing times, and the timing of refund receipts via a
structural model of dynamic discrete choice. A critical component of this procedure is the forecasted
future conditional filing probabilities arrived at via rational expectations. As outlined above, we first
construct bin estimates for conditional filing probabilities in each year using deciles of refund values.
One challenge to creating such values is that VITA sites are closed on holidays and Sundays. We
address this by altering our measure of time to reflect only those days where the VITA sites are
open each year. A total of 65 days in the tax filing season remain. Note that recognizing a change
in the effective timing of choices also requires us to change the intertemporal tradeoffs built in to
our estimator.28 For each year, on each day VITA sites are open, in each decile of refund value, we
calculate the empirical proportion of individuals who have yet to file who file on that day. A total of
28Recall from section 3.1.1 that we are able to assume that the terminal option is taken in the next period. To
account for days that the VITA sites are closed we simply assume that the next period is two periods away resulting
in the conditional probability p(1it|1it,bi)=1
1+exp[(δk+2−δk)b−(δ−1)c−δln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))]
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Figure 1: Filing Times and Refund Values
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4589 bins are constructed delivering corresponding bin estimates for conditional filing probabilities,
p˜(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi).
Table 2: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.536 0.592 0.638 0.673 0.718 0.738
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.341 5 10 20 50 75
(0.017) - - - - -
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -65402.38 -68149.51 -87536.58 -131490.15 -248985.03 -334805.80
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.157 0.181 0.197 0.201 0.204 0.205
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0053 -0.0041 0.0061 0.0104 0.0114 0.0115
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood
Estimation for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in
parentheses. Also reported is the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t) − pˆ(1t|1t), and the average
excess unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline.
Table 2 presents aggregate parameter values based on the data from 2005 to 2007. The data
from 2008 and out-of-sample analysis of the 2008 Stimulus Payments are presented in section 4.3. In
column (1) we estimate both the discount factor, δ, and filing cost, c, finding an average filing cost
of cˆ = 3.341 and a discount factor of δˆ = 0.536.29 In columns (2) through (6) of Table 2 we impose
different levels of cost of filing and vary it from c = 5 to c = 75. Note that identified likelihoods
reduce sharply under restrictions to c, indicating that the likelihood is not apparently flat around the
maximum. The estimated discount factor ranges from δˆ = 0.59 to δˆ = 0.74 and increase uniformly
as costs increase.
The estimates indicate that even under relatively high parameterizations of costs, estimated
29As discussed in section 3.1.3, our discount factor has two sources of identification. The first comes from the
formulation of the problem, yielding differences between the timing of costs and benefits. Without k > 0, separate
estimation of δ and c would be impossible. In Appendix Table A4, we reconduct the analysis of Table 2 with the
assumption of k = 0 for all filers. These estimates show the hallmarks of identification problems with flat likelihoods,
sensitivity to starting values and, at times, failed convergence. The second comes from the timing impacts of direct
deposit. In Appendix Table A5 and A6, we provide separate estimates for individuals with and without direct deposit,
showing qualitatively similar, though substantially less precise estimates across the two groups.
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Panel A: Conditional Filing Probabilities Panel B: Filing Times and Refund Values
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Figure 2: Predicted and Actual Filing Behavior
discount factors still remain far from 1. In order to capture empirical regularities of not dispropor-
tionately filing early, individuals must substantially discount their filing benefits. Hence, receiving
a sizable refund in several week’s time can be outweighed by modest filing costs. Estimates of dis-
count factors in the range observed from Table 2 imply discount rates far below empirical rates of
interest. When such extreme impatience is required to rationalize empirical behavior in field set-
tings, researchers often appeal to calibrational arguments to reject exponential discounting (Fang
and Silverman, 2009; Shapiro, 2005). In contrast, in experimental settings it is not unusual to iden-
tify individual discount rates in the hundreds of percents per year (see, e.g., Frederick et al., 2002).
Our exercise takes the exponential estimates as a correct benchmark and examines the adherence of
intertemporal patterns of filing behavior to theoretical predictions.
Figure 2 presents predicted and actual filing behavior for 2005-2007. In Panel A, we examine
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average predicted and actual conditional filing probabilities, pˆ(1t|1t) and p˜(1t|1t). Predicted and
actual conditional filing probabilities correspond closely early in the filing season, but diverge as the
tax deadline approaches. On the final two days, p˜(1t|1t) exceeds pˆ(1t|1t) by around 30 percentage
points.30 The exponential counterfactual dramatically underpredicts filing probabilities at the end
of the tax season.31
Figure 2, Panel B reproduces the daily filing percentages and average refund values from Figure
132, and also provides corresponding model predictions, 100
N
∑N
i=1 qˆ(1t|bi) and bˆt, respectively. The
estimated exponential model over-predicts the percentage of individuals who file early in the season,
with substantial under-prediction as the tax deadline approaches. Interestingly, because the model
predicts so few people will file during the middle of the tax season, it provides a slight overestimate
for the number of filers the day before the deadline. Panel B also highlights that the aggregate
estimates predict less sensitivity of filing times to refund values than exists in the data. This result is
sensible: given the high degree of impatience, dissimilar refund values have quite similar discounted
implications.33
Table 3 presents estimates of excess mass relative to the exponential benchmark for both con-
ditional and unconditional filing probabilities. The excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t) −
pˆ(1t|1t), is positive for each of penultimate seven days of the tax season ranging from around 6 to
33 percentage points. On average, from T − 7 to T − 1, p˜(1t|1t) exceeds pˆ(1t|1t). Implementing the
bootstrap procedure discussed in section 3.3, we find the difference between observed and predicted
30It is important to note that the presented counterfactual distribution is an in-sample prediction. Exercises of
missing mass generally leave out a region of interest for estimation. As the focus of our project is procrastination, our
primary region of interest is the last seven days of the tax-filing season. In Appendix A , we reconduct our estimation
removing the last seven days of the tax filing season (Table A7). As one might expect, misprediction at the end of the
tax filing season increases substantially when the last seven days are excluded from estimation. In order to provide
more conservative estimates for missing mass we use the full data set for estimation.
31In Appendix Figure A2, we present an alternate counterfactual, ˆˆp(1t|1t), based on the empirical one-period ahead
conditional filing probabilities as opposed to backwards induction. Such a counterfactual makes use of the true one-
period ahead behavior, rather than the model’s prediction and hence delivers a much less smooth counterfactual
distribution. Relative to this benchmark, as well, substantial missing mass is observed.
32The reproduction adjusts to remove Sundays and holidays.
33In Appendix Figures A3 and A4, we reconstruct Figure 2 separately for individuals who receive their refund by
paper check versus direct deposit. This figure demonstrates that the 60% of individuals receiving paper check are
predicted to have virtually constant refund values throughout the tax season. For such a high degree of impatience
almost all values of refunds are discounted to a common base of zero. The model fit for direct deposit refund recipients
is substantially better.
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Table 3: Excess Mass Results
Date Excess Conditional Probability Excess Unconditional Probability
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t)
T − 1 0.325*** -0.0040***
(0.018) (0.0007)
T − 2 0.319*** 0.0095***
(0.014) (0.0008)
T − 3 0.141*** 0.0081***
(0.011) (0.0007)
T − 4 0.119*** 0.0047***
(0.008) (0.006)
T − 5 0.125*** 0.0075***
(0.007) (0.0006)
T − 6 0.081*** 0.0081***
(0.007) (0.0007)
T − 7 0.058*** 0.0038***
(0.006) (0.0006)
T − 1 : T − 7 Average 0.157*** 0.0053***
(0.004) (0.0002)
Notes: Estimates of excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t) − pˆ(1t|1t), and the excess unconditional filing
probability, q˜(1t|1t) − qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. Bootstrapped standard errors in
parentheses from 500 bootstrap samples.
behavior to be highly significant. Stated in unconditional terms, from T − 7 to T − 1 an average
of 0.65% of filers are predicted to arrive each day, while 1.18% actually do. This equates to around
82% more filers than expected by our counterfactual exponential predictions. The data compellingly
reject the estimated model of exponential discounting with δˆ = 0.536 and cˆ = 3.341.
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4.1.1 Alternative Exponential Specifications
The results so far demonstrate deviations between the intertemporal patterns of predicted
and actual filing behavior. Realized conditional filing probabilities exceed those predicted under
exponential discounting by around 30 percentage points in the final days of the tax season. In
the last seven days before the tax deadline, this yields an excess mass of filers of around 80%.
The data deviate from one particular formulation of an optimal stopping problem developed
with assumptions of exponential discounting, rational expectations, homogeneity in costs and
discount factors, and iid type-1 extreme value shocks. Failure of any one of these assumptions
or others implicit in our development may potentially deliver the observed excess mass of filers
at the end of the tax filing season. In the following, we provide a slate of exercises with the
objective of examining whether a neoclassical interpretation for the data is compelling, but has
been overlooked due to functional form assumptions or misspecifications. Specifically, we investigate
extreme costs, extreme shocks, alternate functional forms for utility and heterogeneity in preferences.
Extreme Costs: Table 2 demonstrates that even as costs are fixed at relatively high levels, estimated
discount factors remain far outside the range of canonical values. Two natural questions are: if one
assumes a specific discount factor close to canonical values, how extreme are estimated costs and how
are missing mass estimates altered? Such an exercise links naturally to other exercises in dynamic
discrete choice, which fix discount factors to provide credible estimates of other key parameters (see,
e.g., Bajari et al., 2007; Kennan and Walker, 2011; Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007).
In Table 4, column (1) we fix δ = 0.999 corresponding to an annual discount rate of 44%.
With this parameter fixed, we estimate cˆ = 3045.2. Columns (2) and (3) repeat this analysis for
δ = 0.9999 and 0.99999 corresponding to around 4% and 1% annual discount rates, respectively.
Across specifications, for discount factors close to empirical rates of interest we find cost estimates
in the thousands of dollars.
In Figure 3, we reproduce Figure 2, with the counterfactual generated from the highest likelihood
specification of Table 4, column (3). Notable from Panel A of Figure 3 are the markedly smaller
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Panel A: Conditional Filing Probabilities Panel B: Filing Times and Refund Values
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Notes: Panel A: 2005-2007 predicted and real conditional filing probabilities, pˆ(1t|1t) and p˜(1t|1t), throughout the
tax season with t = 64 corresponding to the day before the tax deadline. Panel B: 2005-2007 predicted and real
unconditional filing probabilities, qˆ(1t|1t) and q˜(1t|1t) as gray dots and bars. Predicted and real average refund values
in black. All predicted values generated from exponential discounting with δ = 0.99999 and cˆ = 2199.056 from Table
4, column (3).
Figure 3: Filing Times and Refund Values (δ (fixed) = 0.99999 and cˆ = 2199.056)
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Table 4: Aggregate Parameter Estimates (Fixing Discount-
ing)
(1) (2) (3)
δ (Fixed) 0.999 0.9999 0.99999
- - -
cˆ 3045.216 1655.558 2199.056
(5.425) (66.519) (666.564)
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -101275.90 -66453.79 -66181.14
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.100 -0.006 -0.007
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : -0.0130 -0.0404 -0.0086
Notes: Structural estimates of filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Max-
imum Likelihood Estimation for years 2005-2007 assuming δ ∈
{0.999, 0.9999, 0.9999}. Assumed level of δ corresponds to annual dis-
count rates between 44% and 1%. Also reported is the average excess
conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t), and the average excess
unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t|1t) − qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days
prior to the tax deadline.
deviations between predicted and actual conditional filing probabilities. One can rationalize
intertemporal patterns in filing behavior with canonical levels of discounting. However, the costs
required to generate such patterns are extreme, on the order of several thousand dollars. Further-
more, as shown in Panel B, the extreme costs encourage substantial delay, generating increasing
proportions of filers through time, and missing the evolution of refund values.
Extreme Shocks: Our model assumes daily i.i.d. shocks associated to both filing and not filing.
Intuitively, the difference between theses shocks represents the stochastic opportunity cost associated
with filing one’s taxes on a given day. In every period, an individual evaluates the benefit of filing
against the value of waiting for a more favorable pattern of shocks. In such environments the
variance of potential shocks is critical. Increasing the scale of shocks has two principle effects. First,
the option value of delay is increased as filers have an incentive to wait for future favorable shocks.
As the deadline approaches this option value erodes, and one should see increased filing close to the
deadline. Second, the incentives to file in any given period are changed. For example, if δ is low and
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Notes: 2005-2007 simulated average conditional filing probabilities p(1t|1t) under exponential discounting. Simulations
of backwards induction behavior under type-1 extreme value shocks with various assumptions for λ, the scale of shocks.
Solid black line corresponds to λ = 1, the assumed value for estimation, and is generated both via simulation and via
iterating on p(1t|1t) backwards with p(1T |1T ) = 1. Panel A assumes δ = 0.536 and c = 3.341, the estimated values
from Table 2, column (1). Panel B assumes δ = 0.99 and c = 3.341
Figure 4: Shocks and Filing Behavior
individuals are unlikely to file in early periods, increasing the variance of shocks makes it more likely
in such periods that an individual will receive a favorable shock constellation and file.34 In contrast,
if δ is high and individuals are more likely to file in early periods, increasing the variance of shocks
should lead to decreased filing probabilities, as it makes it more likely that individuals receive an
unfavorable shock constellation and choose not to file.35
Figure 4 shows simulated conditional filing probabilities as one increases the scale of the type-1
34The negative shocks are less consequential as individuals are already filing with low probability.
35The positive shocks are less consequential as individuals are already filing with high probability.
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extreme value shocks from that assumed by our estimation, λ = 1, to λ = 60.36 The above-noted
effects are demonstrated both for the low level of patience implied by the estimates of Table 2,
Column (1) and for δ = 0.99 and c = 3.34. When patience is low in Panel A, increased λ can
lead to increased filing close to the deadline, but comes with increased filing probabilities early in
the tax season. When patience is high in Panel B, increased λ leads to both increased filing close
to the deadline and decreased filing early in the tax season. Interestingly, with λ = 60, one can
qualitatively match patterns in intertemporal filing behavior with conditional filing probabilities of
around 3% early in the season and close to 40% at the end. However, the scale of shocks required
to generate such patterns are extreme. For example, with λ = 60, an individual at t = 55 with
a conditional filing probability of 0.03 only files if she observes an opportunity cost $210 more
favorable than the mean. Given a population making an average wage of $9 per hour, we view this
as implausibly extreme.37
Heterogeneity in Preferences and Costs: The data demonstrate increasing filing close to the tax dead-
line relative to a benchmark of exponential discounting where the heterogeneity across individuals
is described only by differences in refund values and direct deposit status. One can imagine other
degrees of heterogeneity, the ignorance of which may lead to apparent deviations due to aggregation
across types. Though comprehensive exploration of such heterogeneity lies beyond the scope of our
data, we can examine whether our measures of excess mass are sensitive to recognizing heterogeneity
in preferences or costs along observable characteristics.
36For each of these models we simulate decision making for 500 randomly sampled individuals from our data set.
That is, we sample pairs of refund values and direct deposit statuses. We recursively solve the optimization problem,
detailed in section 3.1, at various levels of λ – the scale parameter of type-1 extreme value shocks. To this end, we
assume a filing probability of 1 in the final period, t = 65, and simulate 10000 shocks for each period and possible
action. Using the empirical distributions of shocks we calculate the probability of filing in period t as the proportion
of realized shocks that induce an individual to file in period t. This proportion is then averaged across the 500
randomly sampled subjects. The location parameter is fixed to µ = −γ throughout, such that the expected value of
the shocks along with their variance is changing across specifications. A solid black line is provided corresponding to
our benchmark assumptions of µ = −γ, λ = 1. This solid black line is generated both by simulation and by simply
iterating backwards the conditional filing probability function, p(1it|1it, bi) with p(1iT |1iT , bi) = 1, ensuring that our
maximum likelihood construction does indeed map to the assumed decisionmaking process.
37It is worth noting that as t get smaller, i.e. further from the deadline, the probability of filing shrinks. This
indicates that individuals would only file with opportunity costs more favorable than $210 better than the mean.
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Following the estimation strategy outlined in section 3.1, in Table 5 we allow for either the
discount factor or estimated filing costs to depend on the observable demographic characteristics:
age, race, gender, and college experience. That is, for each characteristic we allow for the univariate
heterogeneity in our likelihood expression, δ = α0 + α1X or c = α0 + α1X, where X is age or an
indicator for an individual being black, being male, or having college experience.38 Table 5 reports
the excess conditional and unconditional filing probability, averaged over individuals in the final seven
days of the tax season after allowing for each type of univariate heterogeneity. With the exception
of heterogeneity in discount factors across race, none of these analyses change appreciably the excess
mass in filing probability in the final seven days of the tax season.39
Table 5: Heterogeneity in Preferences and Costs
Heterogeneous Parameter
δ c
T − 1 : T − 7 Average T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t)
Heterogeneity by
- 0.157 0.0053 0.157 0.0053
Age 0.169 0.0018 0.167 0.0032
Gender 0.151 0.0059 0.151 0.0058
Race 0.056 -0.0022 0.152 0.0062
College Exp 0.195 0.0076 0.151 0.0053
Notes: Table entries correspond to average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t), or unconditional filing probability,
q˜(1t|1t) − qˆ(1t|1t), over the last seven days prior to the tax deadline allowing for one degree of heterogeneity in either δ or c.
Heterogeneity incorporated into likelihood formulation by assuming either δ = α0 + α1X or c = α0 + α1X, where X is age or an
indicator for an individual being black, being male, or having college experience. Where heterogeneity in self-reported demographics
is analyzed, estimation is performed only on individuals with complete data.
Functional Form for Utility: Our estimation procedure makes two critical assumptions with respect
to the nature of utility. First, we posit that filing secures a benefit of size δkbi, effectively assuming
that the refund will be consumed, and hence yield utility, entirely in the period it is received.
Second, we assume that utility is linear in money. In Tables 6 and 7 we relax these two assumption.
In Table 6, we reconduct the analysis of Table 2 assuming that individuals smooth their refund
38Note that his exercise requires the one-period ahead conditional filing probabilities to be recalculated for the source
of heterogeneity included in the estimation. We also attempted to examine heterogeneity in observables for c and δ
allowing for multivariate heterogeneity, but our maximum likelihood estimations failed to converge on these attempts.
39In Appendix Figure A5, we reconstruct Figure 2 for the most promising of these analyses, heterogeneity in discount
factors by race. Though conditional filing probabilities are well-captured by the estimator, the evolution of refund
values through time is markedly mis-estimated.
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consumption over thirty days.40 Assuming such smoothing only marginally alters the estimates. As
opposed to our prior estimates of δˆ = 0.536, we estimate δˆ = 0.634 and estimated costs are virtually
identical. Even when assuming higher costs, estimated discount factors remain lower than canonical
values. Additionally, the excess conditional filing probability at the end of the tax season remains
substantial. As opposed to 15.7 percentage points from our prior estimates, the average excess over
the penultimate 7 days in Table 6, Column (1) is 14.1 percentage points.
Table 6: Aggregate Parameter Estimates (Allowing Smoothing)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.634 0.704 0.751 0.782 0.820 0.837
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.305 5 10 20 50 75
(0.022) - - - - -
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -65390.10 -67053.49 -78504.36 -105805.96 -178727.20 -230049.50
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.141 0.156 0.174 0.185 0.195 0.197
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0042 -0.0124 -0.0035 0.0064 0.0092 0.0094
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood
Estimation for years 2005-2007. Likelihood contribution adjusted to reflect smoothing of payments over 30 days.
Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses. Also reported is the
average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t)−pˆ(1t|1t), and the average excess unconditional filing probability,
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline.
In Table 7 we assume a power functional form for utility of money, u(b) = bα and provide esti-
mates corresponding to Table 2, column (1) for α ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}.41 Even assuming substantial
curvature for utility, estimated discount factors remain far from 1. Additionally, for the highest like-
40This changes the estimated choice probability to
p(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp
[
(δk+31 − δk) bi30 − (δ − 1)c− δln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))
] .
Filing in t relative to t+ 1 ensures b30 more in period t+ k and
b
30 less in period t+ k + 31.
41This changes the estimated choice probability to
p(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp [(δk+1 − δk)bαi − (δ − 1)c− δln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))]
.
The estimates of Table 2 correspond to α = 1.
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lihood specification, Column (3), excess mass remains substantial, with an average excess conditional
filing probability over the penultimate 7 days of 14.6 percentage points.
Table 7: Aggregate Parameter Estimates (Fixing Curvature)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δˆ 0.674 0.641 0.605 0.570
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
cˆ 3.331 3.344 3.345 3.344
(0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019)
α 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
- - - -
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -65386.87 -65371.36 -65370.26 -65381.41
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.132 0.140 0.146 0.152
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0036 0.0041 .0046 0.0050
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, ob-
tained via Maximum Likelihood Estimation for years 2005-2007 Likelihood contribu-
tion adjusted to reflect curvature for utility of money, u(b) = bα. Columns (1) - (4)
assuming α ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. Standard errors in parentheses. Also reported is
the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t), and the average
excess unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t|1t) − qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior
to the tax deadline.
4.2 Estimates of Present-Biased (β − δ) Discounting
The previous sections demonstrate a substantial deviation between predicted behavior assuming
exponential discounting and actual tax filing behavior. Additionally, examination of costs, shocks,
smoothing, curvature, and heterogeneity in preferences while retaining exponential discounting have
all proven lacking in some way. In this section, we examine the implications of assuming a behavioral
model of choice, specifically present-biased preferences.
For this analysis we assume quasi-hyperbolic β − δ discounting of the form proposed by Laibson
(1997); O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). An individual is assumed to discount between the present and
a future period with discount factor βδ, but discount between any two future periods with discount
factor, δ alone. If β < 1 the individual is ‘present-biased’, while if β = 1, the individual behaves as an
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exponential discounter.42 The quasi-hyperbolic model elegantly delivers deviations from exponential
discounting such as self-control problems, procrastination being one potential manifestation. Because
such models feature inconsistencies between long run plans and short run behavior, they require the
researcher to provide a formulation of the individual’s beliefs about their own predilection to be
present-biased in the future. For our analysis we make the analytically tractable, but admittedly
extreme, assumption that individuals are naive with respect to their present bias. That is, they
believe that in the future they will behave as if β = 1. This assumption and the simplification it
generates for analysis is also noted and justified in DellaVigna et al. (Forthcoming).43
Incorporating present bias into our estimation procedure requires several steps. First, as noted in
section section 3.1, our exponential formulation assumes rational expectations for the construction
of one period ahead conditional filing probability bin estimates. A naive present-biased individual
deviates from rational expectations in the sense that he believes his filing behavior will follow the
path of an exponential discounter rather than the true path. As such the true, rational expectations
filing probability p˜(1it|1it, bi) does not reflect this decisionmaker’s belief and so cannot be used to
facilitate estimation. However, the assumption of naivete proves useful in this environment. For a
given δ and c, one can solve for the path of beliefs via backwards induction as
pn(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp [(δk+1 − δk)bi − (δ − 1)c− δln(pn(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))] .
and pn(1i,T |1i,T , bi) = 1. With pn(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi) as the forecasted future behavior, we can then
estimate β via maximum likelihood under the assumed value of δ and c using similar methods as
3.1.44 The likelihood contribution for the critical case of fit = 1 becomes
pβδ(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp [β(δk+1 − δk)bi − (βδ − 1)c− βδln(pn(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))] .
In effect, the estimator replaces the rational expectations beliefs inherent to our exponential con-
42Additionally, the case of β > 1 is termed ‘future-biased’.
43However, the assumption of full naivete would be inconsistent with the substantial literature on commitment
demand noted in footnote 1.
44The derivation of this expression is presented in Appendix A.3
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struction with naive beliefs, and then estimates present bias using these systematically miscalibrated
forecasts.
Table 8 provides results from this analysis. In each column, we first use a fixed level of cost and
δ to construct pn(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi). Then we estimate β under these assumed parameters. Notable
from Table 8 is the relatively small degree of estimated present bias. With exponential discounting
and these values of δ, costs were estimated on the order of several thousand dollars. In contrast,
with reasonable value for cost, present bias of only a few percentage points can effectively deliver the
same behavior. Of particular importance are the estimates from column (4), the highest likelihood
specification. With δ = 0.99999 and costs of c = 3, we estimate β = 0.92, close to recent empirical
estimates for present bias from intertemporal effort choices.45
Table 8: Present-Biased (β-δ) Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β 0.81 0.91 0.98 0.92 0.98 0.99
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.001)
δ 0.9999 0.9999 0.99999 0.99999 0.99999 0.99999
- - - - - -
c 10 20 2 3 5 10
- - - - - -
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -70482.8 -71638.5 -66039.1 -66023.1 -66038.1 -66041.9
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.162 0.156 0.032 0.048 0.037 0.032
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0007 -0.0007 0.0022 0.0024 0.0014 0.0016
Notes: Structural estimates of quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter β obtained via Maximum Likelihood
Estimation for year 2005-2007. Likelihood contribution adjusted to reflect present bias with naive beliefs,
pn(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi) for a given δ and c. Columns (1) and (2) restrict δ = 0.9999, columns (3) through (6)
restrict δ = 0.99999. Costs, c, restricted across columns from 2 to 10. Standard errors in parentheses.
Also reported is the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t) − pˆ(1t|1t), and the average excess
unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline.
Allowing for present bias also dramatically alters the extent of excess mass at the end of the tax
45Augenblick et al. (2015) estimate β = 0.88 and Augenblick and Rabin (2016) estimte β = 0.83 from intertemporal
effort choices.
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Notes: Panel A: 2005-2007 predicted and real conditional filing probabilities, pˆ(1t|1t) and p˜(1t|1t), throughout the
tax season with t = 64 corresponding to the day before the tax deadline. Panel B: 2005-2007 predicted and real
unconditional filing probabilities, qˆ(1t|1t) and q˜(1t|1t) as gray dots and bars. Predicted and real average refund values
in black. All predicted values generated from quasi-hyperbolic discounting with δ = 0.99999, c = 3 and β = 0.92 from
Table 8, column (4).
Figure 5: Present Bias, Filing Times and Refund Values (β = 0.92, δ = 0.99999, c = 3)
filing season. In Table 8, column (3), the excess conditional filing probability reduces by around
75% compared to our baseline estimates, with p˜(1|1t)− pˆ(1|1t) averaging around 5 percentage points
over the penultimate 7 days of the tax season. Figure 5 reproduces Figure 2 with these estimates.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting with a relatively modest degree of present bias, β = 0.92, matches
intertemporal patterns in conditional and unconditional filing probabilities as well as the evolution
of refund values through time.46
Taken together, these analyses show that though there are candidate alternative neoclassical
rationalizations for observed conditional filing probabilities, they all require potentially extreme,
implausible assumptions. By-and-large these neoclassical alternatives also miss key aspects of in-
46In Appendix Figures A6 and A7 we reconstruct Figure 2 separately for individuals who receive their refund by
paper check versus direct deposit. This figure demonstrates that the behavior of both paper check and direct deposit
refund recipients is well matched by the aggregate estimates, with sensitivity in filing times to refund values predicted
for both groups.
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tertemporal filing behavior, either the evolution of unconditional filing probabilities or the evolution
of refund values through time. In contrast, β − δ discounting with δ close to canonical values,
reasonable values of costs, and a relatively mild degree of present bias can rationalize all observed
behavior.47
4.2.1 The Extent of Procrastination
Present-biased preferences with a moderate degree of present bias provides a credible account of
the data from 2005-2007. Estimates in hand, we can deliver a measure of potential procrastination
for every tax filer. Consider tax filer i who files on date t with the aggregate parameter levels of β,
δ, and c. At date t, two measures are relevant for determining potential procrastination:
1− Πt−1s=0(1− pn(1is|1is, bi)),
the probability the individual naively believed he would have filed already; and
1− Πt−1s=0(1− pˆβδ(1is|1is, bi)),
the probability the individual actually would have filed already.48 If the individual naively believes
it is higher probability that she would have filed in periods 0 to t− 1 than it truly was, then she is
potentially a procrastinator. Examining such measures on the date of filing is natural as it provides
a single, relevant snapshot to evaluate the possibility of procrastination.49
Figure 6 reproduces the histograms of filing probabilities from Figure 2, Panel B, highlighting
those individuals who could be potential procrastinators. From 2005-2007, twenty-one percent of
47Furthermore, these results are reproduced when predicting out-of-sample to filing behavior in 2008. That is, we
demonstrate that the out-of-sample fit of intertemporal filing behavior is superior for quasi-hyperbolic preferences
relative to the neoclassical model – see appendix figures A8 and A9.
48Examination of the formulas for pn and pβδ will reveal that is is not the case that one of these measures always
exceeds the other. Additionally, because refund values and direct deposit status differ across individuals, the difference
between these measures will not be identical for all filers.
49For example, looking at the difference between these two measures on the last (first) day of the tax filing season
for every filer would capture only that many (no) people would have been procrastinators had they filed on the last
(first) day.
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Notes: 2005-2007 real unconditional filing probabilities, q˜(1t|1t) as light gray bars. Dark gray bars are potential pro-
crastinators on each filing date, t, calculated as proportion of filing individuals for whom 1−Πt−1s=0(1−pn(1is|1is, bi)) >
1−Πt−1s=0(1− pˆβδ(1is|1is, bi)).
Figure 6: Filing Times and Potential Procrastinators
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filers are potential procrastinators over the course of the tax season. Notably, as the tax season
evolves, the extent of potential procrastination grows. In the penultimate seven days of the filing
season roughly seventy-one percent of filers have potentially procrastinated. It must be noted that
though the number of potential procrastinators is large, the difference between naive and present-
biased probabilities is quite muted. Among filers in the seven days prior to the deadline, the average
naive belief on prior filing is calculated to be 95.04%, while the average present-biased probability is
94.85%.
4.3 Response to Changing Incentives: 2008 Stimulus Payments
Rationalizing behavior in-sample with β − δ discounting is important, but does not constitute a
stringent test of present-biased preferences. Given that the behavioral model adds a parameter to the
standard exponential formulation, one should not be overly surprised by its improved fit. Here, we
examine responses to the exogenous changes in filing incentives imposed by the Economic Stimulus
Act of 2008 to provide an out-of-sample validation for our behavioral interpretation.
In Figure 7, we provide a difference-in-difference investigation of whether receiving a 2008 Stimulus
Payment induced earlier filing. Using the parameters of 2008 Stimulus Act, we calculate (without
adjusting for inflation) the value of each individual’s potential Stimulus Payment for 2005, 2006, and
2007. We present median filing times (solid lines in both panels) for individuals who would and would
not receive Stimulus Payments from 2005 to 2008. In years prior to 2008, those with and without
potential Stimulus Payments follow very similar trends with potential recipients filing earlier.50 In
2008, the trends diverge. Those without Stimulus Payments in 2008 continue to file later in the tax
season, while those with Stimulus Payments file earlier.
Given the apparent response to the 2008 Stimulus Payments, a natural question is how well 2008
filing behavior is predicted both in general and with respect to the sensitivity of filing to Stimulus
Payments. For both our estimated benchmark model of exponential discounting, Table 2, column (1),
and present bias, Table 8, column (3), we can predict each individual’s conditional filing probability
50The earlier filing of potential recipients is likely due to the Stimulus Payment’s income threshholds and the larger
proportional refunds for lower-income individuals in the sample.
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in 2008, pˆ(1it|1it, bi) and pˆβδ(1it|1it, bi), respectively. Similarly, we can construct expected filing days,
tˆ∗ and tˆ∗βδ.
51 Hence, we can examine both whether out-of-sample our estimates reliably reproduce
the patterns in filing behavior in general and the apparent sensitivity to rebate payments.
Along with true filing times, in Figure 7 we present (dotted lines) mean predicted filing times
under exponential and β− δ discounting, respectively. These predictions are in-sample for 2005-2007
and out-of-sample for 2008. Panel A demonstrates that the exponential model’s predicted filing
times are somewhat earlier than true filing times. Importantly, because of the extreme estimated
degree of impatience under exponential discounting, the model predicts effectively no responsiveness
to the changing incentives generated by the 2008 rebates. In contrast, the estimated model of present
bias both matches the difference between potential recipients and non-recipients from 2005-2007 and
closely predicts the observed sensitivity to stimulus receipt.
Table 9 shows the results of Figure 7 in more detail. Column (1) provides corresponding regression
analysis of the true day of filing, t∗. The results show that receiving a Stimulus Payment in 2008
(coefficient of variable Interaction) induced tax filers to arrive 1.92 (s.e. = 0.98) days earlier.52
Adding control variables in Column (2) and (3) does not change the results dramatically. So, potential
stimulus recipients file earlier in the years 2005 to 2007 and disproportionately so in 2008, the year
of the stimulus.
Columns (4)-(9) provide predicted difference-in-difference estimates for the exponential and β−δ
predictions – corresponding to the dotted lines in Figure 7. In contrast to the exponential model (in
column (4)-(6)), the table demonstrats that β − δ discounting delivers a plausible account both of
the average filing times and of the sensitivity of filing times to the 2008 Stimulus Payments. The
51These values take into account for each individual not only their standard refund, but also their projected 2008
Stimulus Payment. In order to develop this projection, we assume that the Stimulus Payment will be received 14 days
after the refund. For example for exponential discounting,
pˆ(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp
[
(δˆk+1 − δˆk)b+ (δˆk+14+1 − δˆk+14)r − (δˆ − 1)cˆ− δˆln(pˆ(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))
] ,
where r is the Stimulus Payment, with pˆ(1iT |1iT , bi) = 1.
52Appendix Table A8 provides a placebo test, turning on the Stimulus Payments in 2007 as opposed to 2008. Null
effects of Stimulus Payments are observed, supporting the view that earlier filing dates for payment recipients in 2008
are truly due to the Stimulus Payment and not other factors.
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Notes: Mean filing dates, t∗, for potential stimulus recipients (diamonds) and non-recipients (circles) from 2005 to
2008. Panel A: predicted filing date, tˆ∗, from exponential discounting for stimulus recipients and non-recipients with
δˆ = 0.536 and cˆ = 3.341, from Table 2, column (1). Predictions are in-sample for 2005-2007 and out-of-sample for
2008, the year of the Stimulus Payments. Panel B: predicted filing date, tˆ∗βδ, from quasi-hyperbolic discounting with
δ = 0.99999, c = 3 and β = 0.92, from Table 8, column (4). Predictions are in-sample for 2005-2007 and out-of-sample
for 2008, the year of the Stimulus Payments.
Figure 7: Filing Dates, Stimulus Payments, and Out-of-Sample Predictions
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predicted mean response to the stimulus of 2.34 (s.e. = 0.10) days (in column (7)) under β − δ
preferences closely matches the true sensitivity of around 2 days.
Table 9: Predicted and Actual Difference-in-Difference Effect of Stimulus Payments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Var. t∗ tˆ∗ tˆ∗βδ
Observed Filing Day Exponential Predicted Filing Day β-δ Predicted Filing Day
1Stimulus Rebate > 0 -3.731*** -1.079* -0.797 -2.044*** 0.690*** 0.782*** -4.852*** -0.229*** -0.155***
(0.545) (0.574) (0.593) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.064) (0.020) (0.017)
1Year = 2008 1.682* 1.781* 1.744* 0.031 0.119 0.114 -0.036 0.056 0.048
(0.944) (0.945) (0.943) (0.022) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.041) (0.034)
Interaction -1.919* -1.647* -1.766* -0.299*** -0.073 -0.062 -2.346*** -2.136*** -2.154***
(0.983) (0.982) (0.981) (0.056) (0.080) (0.079) (0.103) (0.044) (0.037)
Constant 30.722*** 31.619*** 31.618*** 25.766*** 26.664*** 26.691*** 31.408*** 32.009*** 32.008***
(0.520) (0.523) (0.527) (0.015) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029) (0.005) (0.008)
# Observations 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525
Control Set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control Set 2 No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression for difference-in-difference effect of Stimulus Payment. Columns (1-3): Dependent variable is actual filing day,
t∗. Columns (4-6): Dependent variable is predicted filing day, tˆ∗ under exponential discounting with δˆ = 0.536 and cˆ = 3.341, from Table 2, column
(1). Columns (7-9): Dependent variable is predicted filing day, tˆ∗βδ, from quasi-hyperbolic discounting with δ = 0.99999, c = 3 and β = 0.92, from
Table 8, column (4). Columns (4-6) and (7-9) predictions are in-sample for 2005-2007 and out-of-sample for 2008, the year of the Stimulus Payments.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Control Set 1: Refund, AGI, Direct Deposit Status.
Control Set 2: Number of Dependents, Taxable Income, Earned Income, Social Security Benefits, Filing Status Binaries (2008 stimulus act determinants).
Levels of significance: ***, **, * for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
4.4 Experimental Present Bias and Tax Filing Behavior
In addition to examining out-of-sample predictive power for β− δ in filing behavior, our environ-
ment provides independent means for identifying present-biased preferences. As described in detail
in section 2.3, we elicited time preferences experimentally for a subsample of around 1100 individuals
in 2007 and 2008.
For each experimental subject we can link their experimental measure of present bias,
Present Biasedi, to their individually fitted pattern of conditional file probabilities, pˆ(1it|1it, bi),
and their expected filing date, tˆ∗.53 Figure 8, presents real and predicted conditional filing prob-
abilities separately for present-biased and not present-biased subjects. Because our experiment is
53In order to construct the predicted conditional filing probabilities in-sample for each individual, we re-estimate
the baseline exponential model of Table 2, column (1) including the 2008 data (and the Stimulus Payments). The
corresponding parameter values are effectively unchanged from those reported in Table 2, column (1) with δˆ = 0.527
and cˆ = 3.295. From these estimates we construct the counterfactual pˆ(1it|1it, bi) for each individual via backwards
induction.
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conducted at only one VITA site, which was not open every day of the tax season, a number of days
have no individuals filing. Hence, Figure 8 provides 5 day running averages beginning at the tax
deadline and moving backwards.54
Different patterns of mis-prediction are apparent across present-biased and non present-biased
subjects. Though predicted conditional filing probabilities are similar across the two groups, real
behavior is markedly different. Present-biased subjects file with higher probability close to the
filing deadline and provide greater deviations between predicted and actual behavior than their non
present-biased counterparts.
Table 10 provides corresponding analysis. In column (1), we regress predicted conditional filing
probabilities, pˆt(1it|1it, bi), on the day of filing, t, an indicator for Present Biased, and their interac-
tion. Present-biased subjects do not differ in terms of their predicted filing dates at any part of the
tax season. In column (2), we present an identical regression with true conditional filing probabil-
ities, p˜(1it|1it, bi), as dependent variable. Present-biased subjects indeed file with lower probability
at the beginning of the tax season and with greater probability at the end of the tax season. In
column (3), we present regressions with the difference, p˜(1it|1it, bi)− pˆ(1it|1it, bi), as dependent vari-
able. Present-biased subjects are found to file with lower probability than expected early in the
tax filing season and with higher probability than expected late in the tax filing season. Columns
(4)-(6) repeat this analysis with predicted and actual filing times, tˆ∗ and t∗, as dependent variables.
Experimentally measured present bias is predictive of filing later in the tax season and filing later
than the exponential model prediction. Table 10 demonstrates the plausibility of interpreting our
measures of missing mass as evidence of procrastination. Experimental measures of present bias are
tightly linked to the exponential model’s mis-prediction of filing behavior close to the tax deadline.
54The unsmoothed figure is provided in Appendix A Figure A10 and presents qualitatively similar, albeit noisier
results.
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Notes: 2007-2008 predicted and real conditional filing probabilities, pˆ(1t|1t) and p˜(1t|1t), throughout the tax season
with t = 64 corresponding to the day before the tax deadline. Panel A: Present-Biased Subjects (n= 360). Panel B:
Not Present-Biased Subjects (n= 754) All predicted values generated from exponential discounting with δˆ = 0.527
and cˆ = 3.295. Data smoothed with 5 day running average.
Figure 8: Predicted and Actual Filing Probabilities by Present Bias
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Table 10: Present Bias and Deviations from Exponential Prediction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conditional Filing Probability Filing Day
Dependent Variable: Predicted Observed Difference Predicted Observed Difference
pˆt(1it|1it, bi) p˜(1it|1it, bi) p˜(1it|1it, bi)− pˆt(1it|1it, bi) tˆ∗ t∗ t∗ − tˆ∗
Present Biased (=1) 0.0002 -0.0081*** -0.0083*** -0.0121 2.5545** 2.5666**
(0.0005) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.1687) (1.1365) (1.1156)
Present Biased x Day 0.0000 0.0003** 0.0003** - - -
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Day 0.0000 0.0011*** 0.0011*** - - -
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0372*** 0.0072*** -0.0300*** 23.5255*** 31.1844*** 7.6588***
(0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0987) (0.6722) (0.6556)
R-Squared 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.005
# Filers 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
# Observations 36736 36736 36736 1114 1114 1114
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression for relationship between experimental measure of present bias, predicted and actual filing behavior.
Columns (1) through (3): Dependent variables constructed from predicted and observed conditional filing probabilities, pˆt(1it|1it, bi) and
p˜(1it|1it, bi). Columns (4) through (6): Dependent variables constructed from predicted and observed filing times: tˆ∗ and t∗. Predicted
values constructed under exponential discounting with δˆ = 0.527 and cˆ = 3.295. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual in
columns (1) through (3), robust in columns (4) through (6).
Levels of significance: ***, **, * for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
5 Conclusion
Procrastination is a critical deviation between long term plans and short term behavior, incon-
sistent with the neoclassical formulation of exponential discounting. Recognizing the challenges of
identifying behavioral models of such deviations in field data, this paper presents a way to potentially
identify present-biased procrastination. Combining methods from structural estimation of dynamic
discrete choice and inference from missing mass, we show a way in which deviations from a spe-
cific model of exponential discounting can be measured. We compare realized tax-filing behavior to
counterfactual estimates from an optimal stopping problem developed under the assumption of expo-
nential discounting. In a sample of around 22,000 low-income tax filers, realized and exponentially-
predicted distributions of filing probabilities differ dramatically as the tax deadline approaches. The
existence and location of the missing mass in tax filing behavior is consistent with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting with a relatively small degree of present bias. This interpretation of present bias is bol-
stered by out-of-sample prediction for the sensitivity of filing times to the 2008 stimulus payments,
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and incentivized experimental measures of time preferences.
The results presented here rely on linkages across a diverse set of prior research and may, similarly,
have implications across a range of fields. First, the paper shows that using structural estimation to
develop counterfactual distributions for behavior may valuably expand the scope of missing mass ex-
ercises and sharpen corresponding tests. When using a structural benchmark, one need not rely (as is
tradition) on a smooth counterfactual distribution through a point of potentially changing incentives
to identify missing mass. Further, one knows precisely the model rejected when realized deviations
are observed. Though these points are general, we believe that specific behavioral applications in
intertemporal choice could be readily implemented. Stopping problems of the form examined here
such as submitting applications, changing retirement plans or credit cards, and mortgage refinance
abound, and corresponding behaviors are often anecdotally linked to present-biased preferences. A
valuable line of research could emerge from precise structural investigation of whether and the extent
to which behavior deviates from exponential benchmarks in these settings. While we show that our
missing mass is compellingly rationalized by a form of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, many alternative
models exist. Future work in this vein should both investigate other models of time preferences and
relax our critical assumption of na¨ıvete´.
Second, the paper provides both a rationalization for the observed deviations from exponen-
tial discounting and a corresponding out-of-sample validation exercise. Given that many candidate
theories can rationalize an observed deviation from a given model, such tests should be viewed as a
necessary step to exercises of this form. Different candidate theories could have quite different predic-
tions or welfare implications and so knowing the most appropriate one becomes a critical input both
for further study and policy discussion. We believe our exercise shows a path forward particularly
for exercises that ascribe behavioral motivations to findings of missing mass. When candidate ratio-
nalizations include behavioral models with additional free parameters, better in-sample fit should be
viewed as relatively weak evidence of model success.
Third, our interpretation of present bias is bolstered in this paper by incentivized experimental
measures. A prominent discussion in the behavioral literature has questioned the use of monetary dis-
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counting measures, like ours, for the study of time preferences. In principle, the fungibility of money
renders useless such choices for informing the researcher about consumption preferences. Predicting
individual differences in procrastination in the timing of tax-filing — presumably a consumption
preference related to labor-leisure tradeoffs— problematizes such a view. Clearly, future research is
needed to fully understand how, when, and why monetary measures of discounting convey valuable
information on preferences.
Last, but not least, the paper can identify and quantify procrastination in the field for the low
income sample in question. Our results show that roughly seventy-one-five percent of filers in the
last week before the deadline are potential procrastinators. Though we cannot extrapolate from this
prevalence among low-income filers to the broader population, there may be reasons to be interested
in this population specifically. Low income individuals access a number of government services in
a similar way to our intertemporal filing problem. Benefits such as food stamps and temporary
assistance to needy families must be signed up for initially. Benefits in place, the spending of cor-
responding receipts is another intertemporal problem. If the level of present-biased procrastination
measured in our sample is indicative of behavior in accessing and spending such benefits, policy
makers may well be interested in altering the timing of costs and benefits to achieve coverage and
smoothing objectives. Though such targeted policy discussions are now equipped with a key obser-
vation on the potential extent of procrastination, broader debates about the nature and extent of
present bias will require further investigation in more broad populations.
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Figure A1: Histogram of 2008 Stimulus Act Rebates
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Table A1: Summary statistics
Roxbury Filers Full
Experimental Non-Participating
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Age 1296 38.85 606 40.65 26228 37.80
(14.90) (16.22) (15.47)
AGI 1296 17452 606 18498 26248 16914
(13991) (15179) (13586)
Refund 1296 1317 606 1205 26248 1438
(1571) (1482) (1641)
Dependents 1296 0.505 606 0.418 26248 0.567
(0.838) (0.769) (0.90)
1Unemployed 1296 0.101 606 0.112 26247 0.095
(0.302) (0.316) (0.29)
Female 1217 0.644 557 0.636 19881 0.646
(0.479) (0.482) (22.03 )
Black 1211 0.761 556 0.781 19565 0.562
(0.426) (0.414) ( 0.49)
College 1180 0.138 534 0.133 18971 0.154
(0.345) (0.340) (0.36)
Days Until 1296 38.74 606 46.47 26248 43.07
Deadline (21.28) (24.00) (22.03 )
1Direct Dep 1296 0.444 606 0.398 26248 0.389
(0.497) (0.490) ( 0.49)
Table A2: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.539 0.594 0.639 0.673 0.717 0.738
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.279 5 10 20 50 75
(0.028) - - - - -
# Observations 404191 404191 404191 404191 404191 404191
Log-Likelihood -26323.63 -27521.71 -35519.37 -53546.81 -101781.32 -137074.84
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.172 0.198 0.214 0.219 0.221 0.222
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0056 -0.0046 0.0057 0.0102 0.0111 0.0112
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood
Estimation for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in
parentheses. Also reported is the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t) − pˆ(1t|1t), and the average
excess unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table
is a reproduction of 2 but only uses 2007 data.
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Table A3: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, µ = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.534 0.600 0.642 0.675 0.719 0.739
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 2.829 5 10 20 50 75
(0.016) - - - - -
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -65463.96 -70339.45 -91413.34 -135908.46 -253558.83 -339385.71
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.131 0.173 0.191 0.196 0.201 0.202
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0096 -0.0043 0.0061 0.0104 0.0113 0.0116
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood
Estimation for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in
parentheses. Also reported is the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t) − pˆ(1t|1t), and the average
excess unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t|1t) − qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table
is a reproduction of 2 with location parameter µ = 0 (as opposed to µ = −γ)
Table A4: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, k = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.99999 0.9999999 0.999999 0.999999 0.999999 0.999999
(0.000004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 2698.49 5 10 20 50 75
(1397.35) - - - - -
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -66180.702 -66182.362 -66182.361 -66182.359 -66182.352 -66182.346
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : -0.015 -0.018 -0.0189 -0.0189 -0.0190 -0.0190
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : -0.0078 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0025
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mation for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses.
Also reported is the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t), and the average excess unconditional
filing probability, q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction of 2 with
no delay in rebate arrival (k = 0).
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Table A5: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, Paper Check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.631 0.701 0.743 0.770 0.803 0.818
(0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.459 5 10 20 50 75
(0.030) - - - - -
# Observations 623282 623282 623282 623282 623282 623282
Log-Likelihood -40689.023 -41397.661 -47599.246 -63972.131 -110885.69 -145574.88
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.154 0.166 0.187 0.196 0.205 0.207
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0044 -0.0095 -0.0015 0.0093 0.0131 .0135
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mation for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses.
Also reported is the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t), and the average excess unconditional
filing probability, q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction of 2 with
only those who receive their rebates via paper checks.
Table A6: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, Direct Deposit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.515 0.588 0.634 0.669 0.714 0.734
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.16 5 10 20 50 75
(0.033) - - - - -
# Observations 387105 387105 387105 387105 387105 387105
Log-Likelihood -24652.468 -25507.62 -30975.57 -44183.668 -81480.071 -109392.39
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.164 0.176 0.187 0.194 0.202 0.205
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0040 -0.0047 -0.0003 0.0045 .0067 0.0071
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mation for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses.
Also reported is the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t), and the average excess uncondi-
tional filing probability, q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction
of 2with only those who receive their rebates via direct deposit.
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Table A7: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, Exclude Last 7 Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.527 0.590 0.638 0.673 0.717 0.738
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.410 5 10 20 50 75
(0.018) - - - - -
# Observations 916368 916368 916368 916368 916368 916368
Log-Likelihood -62214.02 -64532.95 -82175.01 -122525.93 -230511.93 -309418.03
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
p˜(1t|1t)− pˆ(1t|1t) : 0.131 0.173 0.191 0.196 0.201 0.202
T − 1 : T − 7 Average
q˜(1t|1t)− qˆ(1t|1t) : 0.0096 -0.0043 0.0061 0.0104 0.0113 0.0116
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ, and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood
Estimation for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in
parentheses. Also reported is the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t|1t) − pˆ(1t|1t), and the average
excess unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t|1t) − qˆ(1t|1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table
is a reproduction of 2 while dropping the last 7 days prior to the dealine.
Figure A2: Predicted Filing Times Using 1-Period-Ahead Observed Probabilities
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Figure A3: Filing Times and Refund Values (Paper Check Only)
Figure A4: Filing Times and Refund Values (Direct Deposit Only)
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Figure A5: Filing Times and Refund Values (δ Heterogeneous by Race)
Figure A6: Filing Times and Refund Values (Present Biased, Paper Check Only)
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Figure A7: Filing Times and Refund Values (Present Biased, Direct Deposit Only)
Figure A8: Filing Times and Refund Values 2008 (Time Consistent)
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Figure A9: Filing Times and Refund Values 2008 (Present Biased)
Table A8: Difference-in-Difference Effect of Stimulus Payments (Placebo)
Linear Regression Quantile Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Day Completed Day Completed Day Completed Day Completed
1Stimulus Rebate > 0 -1.0031 -0.6341 -0.9228 -0.6009
(0.7062) (0.7276) (1.1911) (1.1570)
1Year = 2007 1.0079 0.9760 2.2275 2.2980
(1.0067) (1.0075) (1.8180) (1.7438)
Interaction -0.3734 -0.5533 -0.2586 -0.4975
(1.0505) (1.0512) (1.8638) (1.7892)
Constant 31.2434*** 31.2478*** 28.1119*** 28.0560***
(0.6427) (0.6463) (1.1218) (1.0675)
Stimulus Determinants No Yes No Yes
# Observations 15972 15972 15972 15972
Notes: This table demonstrates the relationship between when one filed (Day Completed) and whether one received
a 2008 stimulus rebate. This is placebo test of the interaction between 1Year = 2007 and 1Stimulus Rebate > 0. Standard
errors are cluster by individual.
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Figure A10: Predicted and Actual Filing Behavior by Present Bias (Un-smoothed)
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A.2 Refund Arrival Delay and Identification
We first address the importance in identification of k > 0. Recall that the likelihood expression
of observation t for individual i is:
p(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp [δk(δ − 1)b− (δ − 1)c− δln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))] .
If we let k = 0 then the likelihood expression becomes:
p(1it|1it, bi) = 1
1 + exp [(δ − 1)b− (δ − 1)c− δln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))] .
Note that when k = 0, b and c must be weighted equally in the likelihood expression. This presents
a problem in identification. Since (δ − 1)b− (δ − 1)c = (δ − 1)(b− c), the level sets of p(1it|1it, bi) in
the (δ, c) plane coincide across time periods when solving p(1it|1it, bi) recursively. This is illustrated
in Figure A11. Figure A11 displays the level sets of p(1it|1it, bi) – assuming δ = 0.535, c = 10, refund
= 50 – over time periods t = 61, 62, 63, and 64 in the (δ, c) plane. We observe that the levels sets
separate over different time periods when k = 14, but find no such separation when k = 0.
In our identification, we take p(1it|1it, bi), p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi), and b as given, and we estimate δ and
c via maximum likelihood. We know by observation that p(1it|1it, bi) ∈ (0, 1], ln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi)) ∈
[−6.59, 0] and that the mean refund is $1419. As such, for any 0 < δ < 1 and reason-
able cost parameter c, exp [(δ − 1)b− (δ − 1)c− δln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1, bi))] ≈ 0 =⇒ p(1it|1it, bi) =
1
1+exp[(δ−1)b−(δ−1)c−δln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))] ≈ 1. That is, for reasonable values of c, p(1it|1it, bi) is computa-
tionally 1. However, if k > 0 the relative size of the refund does not necessitate that p(1it|1it, bi) = 1.
This point is illustrated in Figure A12. Figure A12 recreates figure A11 but assumes refund = 1400.
We observe that the levels sets separate over different time periods when k = 14. However, when
k = 0, p(1it|1it, bi) = 1 for all c when fixing any δ. As such, the level sets not only coincide over
all time periods, but coincide over (δ, c) within a time period. Unsurprisingly, when running our
estimator under the assumption k = 0 we find a flat likelihood over all values of c – see Figure A4. In
Figure A13 we see further separation of level curves between time periods when increasing k to 21.
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Figure A11: p(1it|1it, bi) Level Curves, δ = 0.535, c = 10
Hence, differential direct deposit use, which generates differences in k, delivers additional identifying
variation.
12
k = 14, refund = 1400
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Figure A12: p(1it|1it, bi) Level Curves, δ = 0.535, c = 10
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Figure A13: p(1it|1it, bi) Level Curves, δ = 0.535, c = 10
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A.3 Naive β − δ derivation
Recall the Euler equation for the dynamically consistent agent:
Vit(xit, it) = maxait [(δ
kb− c)ait + it(ait) + δE [Vi,t+1(xi,t+1, i,t+1)|xit, ait]]
Since, the naive present-biased agent believes he will act dynamically consistently in all future periods
we may write his current period maximization problem as:
Wit(xit, it) = maxait [(βδ
kb− c)ait + it(ait) + βδE [Vi,t+1(xi,t+1, i,t+1)|xit, ait]]
Recall that the ex-ante value function, V it(xit), is obtained by integrating over the possible realiza-
tions of shocks:
V it(xit) ≡
∫
Vit(xit, it)g(it)dit
We additionally define the conditional value function wit(xit, ait) as the present discounted value (net
of the shocks it) of choosing ait and behaving optimally from period t+ 1 on as
wit(xit, ait) ≡ (βδkb− c)ait + βδ
∫
V i,t+1(xi,t+1)f(xi,t+1|xit, ait)dxi,t+1.
The optimal decision rule at time t solves
αit(xit, it) = arg maxaitwit(xit, ait) + it(ait).
Type-1 Extreme Value Errors
Following the logic of static discrete choice problems, the probability of observing an action ait
conditional on xit is found by integrating out it from the optimal decision rule.
p(ait|xit) =
∫
1[αit(xit, it) = ait]g(it)dit
=
∫
1[arg maxaitvit(xit, ait) + it(ait) = ait]g(it)dit
14
Hence, if we are able to form the conditional value function vit(xit, ait), standard methods can be
applied.
In order to obtain a closed form solution for choice probabilities, we assume type-1 extreme value
distributions leading to the dynamic logit model. The probability of an arbitrary choice ait is given
by
p(ait|xit) = exp(wit(xit, ait))∑
a′it
exp(wit(xit, a′it))
.
Or,
p(ait|xit) = 1∑
a′it
exp(wit(xit, a′it)− wit(xit, ait))
.
Importantly, under the above distributional assumption we also have the ex-ante value function
in closed form.
V it(xit) = ln
∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit, a
′
it))
 .
Using the observation by Hotz and Miller (1993):
V it(xit) = ln
∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit, a
′
it))

V it(xit) = ln
[
exp(vit(xit, a
∗
it))
∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit, a
′
it))
exp(vit(xit, a∗it))
]
V it(xit) = −ln[p(a∗it|xit)] + vit(xit, a∗it)
for some arbitrary action taken at time t, a∗it. This expresses the ex-ante value of being at a given
state as the conditional value of taking an arbitrary action adjusted for a penalty that the arbitrary
action might not be optimal. We can substitute this in to our equation for the conditional value
function to obtain
wit(xit, ait) = (βδ
kb− c)ait + βδ
∫
(vi,t+1(xi,t+1, a
∗
i,t+1)− ln[p(a∗i,t+1|xi,t+1)])f(xi,t+1|xit, ait)dxi,t+1
Recognizing that:
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wit(1, bi, 1) = βδ
kbi − c
wit(1, bi, 0) = βδ
k+1bi − βδc− βδln[p(1|xi,t+1)])
We get:
p(1|xit) = 1
1 + exp [β(δk+1 − δk)b− (βδ − 1)c− βδln(p(1|1i,t+1, bi))] .
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B IRS Announcement of H.R. 5140
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
IRS
Notice 1377 (February 2008)
Catalog Number 51255B
Dear Taxpayer:
Economic Stimulus Payment Notice
www.irs.gov
We are pleased to inform you that the United States Congress passed and President George W.
Bush signed into law the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, which provides for economic stimulus
payments to be made to over 130 million American households. Under this new law, you may be
entitled to a payment of up to $600 ($1,200 if filing a joint return), plus additional amounts for each
qualifying child.
We are sending this notice to let you know that based on this new law the IRS will begin sending
the one-time payments starting in May. To receive a payment in 2008, individuals who qualify will
not have to do anything more than file a 2007 tax return. The IRS will determine eligibility, figure the
amount, and send the payment. This payment should not be confused with any 2007 income tax
refund that is owed to you by the federal government. Income tax refunds for 2007 will be made
separately from this one-time payment.
Individuals who qualify may receive as much as $600 ($1,200 if married filing jointly). Even if you
pay no income tax but have a total of $3,000 or more in earned income, Social Security benefits,
and/or certain veterans’ payments, you may receive a payment of $300 ($600 if married filing
jointly).
In addition, individuals eligible for payments may also receive an additional amount of $300 for
each child qualifying for the child tax credit.
To qualify for the payment, an individual, spouse, and any qualifying child must have a valid Social
Security number. In addition, individuals cannot receive a payment if they can be claimed as a
dependent of another taxpayer or they filed a 2007 Form 1040NR, 1040NR-EZ, 1040-PR, or
1040-SS.
All individuals receiving payments will receive a notice and additional information shortly before the
payment is made. In the meantime, for additional information, please visit the IRS website at
www.irs.gov.
For individuals who normally do not have to file a tax return, the new law provides for payments to
individuals who have a total of $3,000 or more in earned income, Social Security benefits, and/or
certain veterans’ payments. Those individuals should file a tax return for 2007 to receive a payment
in 2008.
For taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) of more than $75,000 (or more than $150,000 if
married filing jointly), the payment will be reduced or phased out completely.
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C Excerpts from Technical Explanation of H.R. 5140
C.1 Explanation of Provision
C.1.1 In general
The provision includes a recovery rebate credit for 2008 which is refundable. The credit mecha-
nism (and the issuance of checks described below) is intended to deliver an expedited fiscal stimulus
to the economy.
The credit is computed with two components in the following manner.
C.1.2 Basic credit
Eligible individuals receive a basic credit (for the first taxable year beginning) in 2008 equal to
the greater of the following:
• Net income tax liability not to exceed 600(1,200 in the case of a joint return).
• 300(600 in the case of a joint return) if: (1) the eligible individual has qualifying income of at
least 3, 000; or(2)theeligibleindividualhasanetincometaxliabilityofatleast1 and gross income
greater than the sum of the applicable basic standard deduction amount and one personal
exemption (two personal exemptions for a joint return).
An eligible individual is any individual other than: (1) a nonresident alien; (2) an estate or trust;
or (3) a dependent. For these purposes, “net income tax liability” means the excess of the sum of
the individual?s regular tax liability and alternative minimum tax over the sum of all nonrefundable
credits (other than the child credit). Net income tax liability as determined for these purposes is
not reduced by the credit added by this provision or any credit which is refundable under present
law. Qualifying income is the sum of the eligible individual’s: (a) earned income; (b) social security
benefits (within the meaning of sec. 86(d)); and (c) veteran’s payments (under Chapters 11, 13, or 15
of title 38 of the U. S. Code). The definition of earned income has the same meaning as used in the
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earned income credit except that it includes certain combat pay and does not include net earnings
from self-employment which are not taken into account in computing taxable income.
C.1.3 Qualifying child credit
If an individual is eligible for any amount of the basic credit the individual also may be eligible
for a qualifying child credit. The qualifying child credit equals $300 for each qualifying child of such
individual. For these purposes, the child credit definition of qualifying child applies.
C.1.4 Limitation based on gross income
The amount of the credit (i.e., the sum of the amounts of the basic credit and the qualifying
child credit) is phased out at a rate of five percent of adjusted gross income above certain income
levels. The beginning point of this phase-out range is $75,000 of adjusted gross income ($150,000 in
the case of joint returns).
C.1.5 Examples of rebate determination
Example 1. - The amount of the credit (i.e., the sum of the amounts of the basic credit and the
qualifying child credit) is phased out at a rate of five percent of adjusted gross income above certain
income levels. The beginning point of this phase-out range is 75, 000ofadjustedgrossincome(150,000
in the case of joint returns).
Example 6. - A married taxpayer filing jointly has $175,000 in earned income, two qualifying
children, and a net tax liability of $31,189 (the taxpayer’s actual liability after the child credit also is
$31,189 as the joint income is too high to qualify). The taxpayer meets the qualifying income test and
the net tax liability test. The taxpayer will, in the absence of the rebate phase-out provision, receive
a rebate of $1,800, comprising $1,200 (greater of $600 or net tax liability not to exceed $1,200),
and $300 per child. The phase-out provision reduces the total rebate amount by five percent of the
amount by which the taxpayer?s adjusted gross income exceeds $150,000. Five percent of $25,000
($175,000 minus $150,000) equals $1,250. The taxpayer’s rebate is thus $1,800 minus $1,250, or $550.
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D Instructions
2008 BOSTON EITC CAMPAIGN                 
RAFFLE QUESTIONS
The following questions are asked for research purposes only. We will never share your 
personal  information  with  any  organization  or  its  representatives.  Please  note  that  any 
winnings may be taxable. 
• Use a No. 2 pencil only. 
• Do not use ink, ballpoint or felt tip pens.
• Make solid marks that fill the oval completely
• Erase cleanly any marks you wish to change
• Make no stray marks on this form
• Do not fold, tear or mutilate this form
As a tax filer at this Volunteer Income Tax Assistance site you are automatically entered in a 
raffle in which you could win up to $50. Just follow the directions below:
How It Works:
In the boxes below you are asked to choose between smaller payments closer to today and larger payments further in the 
future. For each row, choose one payment: either the smaller, sooner payment or the later, larger payment. When you  
return this completed form, you will receive a raffle ticket. If you are a winner, the raffle ticket will have a number on it  
from 1 to 22. These numbers correspond to the numbered choices below. You will be paid your chosen payment. The 
choices you make could mean a difference in payment of more than $35, so … CHOOSE CAREFULLY!!! 
RED BLOCK (Numbers 1 through 7) :        Decide between payment today and payment in one month
BLACK BLOCK (Numbers 8 through 15):  Decide between payment today and payment in six months
BLUE BLOCK (Numbers 16 through 22):   Decide between payment in six months and payment in seven months 
Rules and Eligibility: 
For each possible number below, state whether you would like the earlier, smaller payment or the later, larger payment.  
Only completed raffle forms are eligible for the raffle.
All prizes will be sent to you by normal mail and will be paid by money order. One out of ten raffle tickets will be a  
winner. You can obtain your raffle ticket as soon as your tax filing is complete. You may not participate in the raffle if  
you are  associated  with the  EITC campaign (volunteer,  business  associate,  etc.)  or  an  employee (or  relative  of  an 
employee) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.
TODAY VS. ONE MONTH FROM TODAY
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 1 AND 7?
Decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for sure today   or the larger payment for sure in 
one   month ?  Please answer for each possible number (1) through (7) by filling in one box for each possible number. 
Example: If you prefer $49 today in Question 1 mark as follows:               $49 today or  $50 in one month 
If you prefer $50 in one month in Question 1, mark as follows:  $49 today or  $50 in one month 
If you get number (1): Would you like to receive  $49 today or  $50 in one month
If you get number (2): Would you like to receive  $47 today or  $50 in one month
If you get number (3): Would you like to receive  $44 today or  $50 in one month
If you get number (4): Would you like to receive  $40 today or  $50 in one month 
If you get number (5): Would you like to receive  $35 today or  $50 in one month 
If you get number (6): Would you like to receive  $29 today or  $50 in one month 
If you get number (7): Would you like to receive  $22 today or  $50 in one month 
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TODAY VS. SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 8 AND 15?
Now, decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for sure today or the larger payment for 
sure in six   months ?  Please answer each possible number (8) through (15) by filling in one box for each possible 
number.
If you get number (8): Would you like to receive  $49 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (9): Would you like to receive  $47 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (10): Would you like to receive  $44 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (11): Would you like to receive  $40 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (12): Would you like to receive  $35 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (13): Would you like to receive  $29 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (14): Would you like to receive  $22 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (15): Would you like to receive  $14 today or  $50 in six months 
SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY VS. SEVEN 
MONTHS FROM TODAY
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 16 AND 22?
Decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for sure in six months   or the larger payment for 
sure in seven  months ?  Please answer for each possible number (16) through (22) by filling in one box for each possible 
number. 
If you get number (16): Would you like to receive  $49 in six months or  $50 in seven months
If you get number (17): Would you like to receive  $47 in six months or  $50 in seven months
If you get number (18): Would you like to receive  $44 in six months or  $50 in seven months
If you get number (19): Would you like to receive  $40 in six months or  $50 in seven months 
If you get number (20): Would you like to receive  $35 in six months or  $50 in seven months
If you get number (21): Would you like to receive  $29 in six months or  $50 in seven months 
If you get number (22): Would you like to receive  $22 in six months or  $50 in seven months
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